

QUINTILIAN'S *DE CAUSIS CORRUPTAE ELOQUENTIAE* AND TACITUS' *DIALOGUS DE ORATORIBUS*

I. QUINTILIAN AND TACITUS

Certain proximities between two distinguished but very dissimilar contemporaries, Quintilian and Tacitus, may be stated. Contemporary they were,¹ though the former, born probably a little before A.D. 40, was older by about twenty years.² Both were from outside Rome, Quintilian certainly of provincial, Spanish,³ origin, Tacitus very probably from one of the *Galliae*,⁴ yet both exemplars of *Romanitas*.⁵

Both were favoured by the Flavian emperors, Quintilian in public appointment as the most highly regarded teacher of the major subject in Roman education, oratory,⁶ discoverer of a new function for it in the unpropitious imperial setting and of a new Ciceronian width, not to mention a new moral basis, for it in circumstances equally unpropitious, and finally creator of a new classicizing sensibility in the use of rhetorical language, again inspired by Cicero and strong enough, for a time, to

¹ Precise dates are few and far between, but approximate ones tell a sufficient tale. For evidence and discussion the following in particular may be consulted: for Quintilian, W. Peterson, *Quint.* I.O. 10 (1891); L. Schwabe, *RE* 6 (1909), Fabius 137, cols. 1845ff.; F. H. Colson, I.O. 1 (1924), Introd. ch. 1; A. Stein, *PIR*², Pars 3 (1943), Fabius 59, pp. 109–10; also G. Kennedy's brief but well-documented and critical study, *Quintilian* (New York, 1959), pp. 15ff. (although we disagree on the evidence for *De causis*; cf. below n. 48); the Tacitean dates are very economically presented by Stein in *PIR*², Pars 2 (1936), Cornelius 1467, pp. 365–7. R. Syme's *Tacitus* (1958) contains carefully pondered views also on matters of chronology.

² The conventional date for Quintilian's birth is 'c. 35', though with the qualifications noted, e.g. by Peterson, iii–iv, Schwabe, col. 1845, Colson, ix–x; Syme, p. 108 n. 6 even suggests c. 33. I incline towards 40 ±, cf. Kennedy, p. 15, 'he was studying rhetoric in Rome about A.D. 57... (being) somewhere between fourteen and twenty at the time. This suggests that he was born a few years before or after A.D. 40, probably not so early as 35, which is often given as the date of his birth.' In turn 'the birth of Tacitus may be assigned to 56 or 57', Syme, p. 63, cf. Stein *PIR*², Cornelius 1467, p. 365, 'natus non post a. 58, quoniam a. 88 praetor fuit.' On any of these reckonings Quintilian belonged to the older generation of contemporaries from Tacitus' point of view; Julius Secundus, one of Tacitus' teachers (*Dial.* 2.1), was Quintilian's coeval (*I.O.* 10.3.12 *aequalem meum*).

³ Hier. *Chron.* a. 2104 = A.D. 88 (p. 190 Helm) *ex Hispania Calagurritanus*, Auson. *Prof. Burdig.* 1.7 (p. 49 Peiper) *adserat... Fabium Calagurris alumnus*.

⁴ The best account of the brittle evidence I am aware of is given by Syme in *Tacitus* 2, ch. 45 'The origin of Cornelius Tacitus', especially p. 619 on Plin. *Ep.* 9.23.2 'Italicus es an prouincialis?' and p. 622 on the case for regarding Cisalpine Gaul or *Gallia Narbonensis* as his *patria*.

⁵ *Romanitas* in that sense is obvious in Tacitus' case. As for Quintilian's *Romanitas*, it is expedient to remember Syme's question, *Tacitus*, p. 618: 'But who would have surmised the origin of Quintilian (in contrast to Martial) if it were not attested? That author mentions Spain only once – and there it is with the curious affectation of not knowing much about a certain local word'.

⁶ Quintilian's talent was first officially noticed by Galba in the sixties. Under Vespasian his standing as a barrister and teacher must have been sufficient to justify appointment as holder of the first public Roman chairs of Latin and Greek rhetoric, the stipend to be defrayed from the imperial purse (Hier. *Chron.* a.2084 = A.D. 68, and a.2104 = A.D. 88 [from Suet.], pp. 186, 190 Helm; cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 18). The chronology is not without snags; for discussion, see Schwabe (above n. 1), col. 1849, and Kennedy (above n. 1), 19, 142.

replace Seneca's influence on the previous generation. (I do not call it classicism over against modernism,⁷ for, although classicizing, it has a good deal of modernity in it.) Tacitus, like Quintilian, was favoured by the Flavian emperors;⁸ but unlike him engaged in a traditional *cursus honorum*.⁹ He was held, it seems, in high regard as an orator to whom Quintilian's works must have been of great interest; but he was not yet known as the historian of whom we think when we think of him.

As for their writings, Quintilian summed up his long experience as a teacher (twenty years of it in his official post), in busy retirement¹⁰ under Domitian, who favoured him strongly: the lost *De causis corruptae eloquentiae* most likely in 89,¹¹ and his *magnum opus*, the *Institutio oratoria*, probably in 94–5.¹² He does not appear to have survived Domitian's assassination in 96.¹³ Tacitus' first literary work (although that has been doubted), *Agricola*, was published in 97–8, *Germania* in 98.¹⁴ Whether the *Dialogus de oratoribus* came shortly before the *Agricola*, as C. E. Murgia has recently argued,¹⁵ or, as in the majority view, between 100 and say 109, makes little difference to the putative links with Quintilian's works which I propose to argue in this paper – except that an earlier date would bring the *Dialogus* closer in time to the works of Quintilian.

My title conjoins the *De causis* of the one with the *Dialogus* of the other more closely than most scholars are nowadays prepared to allow. I wish to consider such evidence as comes to hand for conjoining them and at least some of the wider context to which that evidence belongs.

II. QUINTILIAN'S REFERENCES TO 'DE CAUSIS'

All that survives of the *De causis* comes from references to it in the *Institutio*; there are no outside sources. The references are rarely literal quotations, but rather extracts, repetitions of trains of arguments, and technical terms. They are reports rather than fragments in the conventional sense.

⁷ Classicism it is occasionally called, thus in the instructive survey by A. D. Leeman, *Oratoris Ratio* (Amsterdam, 1963), ch. 12 'The classicist movement', ch. 13 'Classicist oratory', ch. 14 'Classicist historiography'. For attempts at greater precision of terminology, see T. Gelzer, 'Klassizismus, Attizismus und Asianismus' in *Le classicisme à Rome* etc. Fond. Hardt, *Entret.* 25 (1978), 1–55, K. Heldmann, below n. 48.

⁸ So in a famous pronouncement Tacitus himself put on record to avow impartiality 'despite benefits owed to the dynasty' (Syme, p. 63). *Hist.* 1.1.3.

⁹ To mention only the *honores* on record, held or designated certainly or possibly under the Flavians: praetor (and *xvuir sacr. fac.*) A.D. 88: *Ann.* 11.11.1; cos. (suff.) in 97: *Plin. Ep.* 2.1.6, for the possibility of designation by Domitian, and Tacitus' earlier posts, see Syme, p. 70 and App. 17.

¹⁰ Quint. *I.O.* 1 pr. 1 *post impetratam studiis quietem, quae per uiginti annos erudiendis iuuenibus impenderem*. The retirement, *quies*, cannot have been very quiet. He suffered great personal misfortunes – the loss of his young wife and his two sons (*I.O.* 6 pr.). He was appointed tutor to Domitian's great-nephews (the emperor's intended heirs, Suet. *Dom.* 15.1), scarcely a sinecure.

¹¹ A.D. 89 according to Kennedy, p. 22 with n. 26; p. 88, Schwabe, col. 1852.

¹² The date is discussed by Schwabe, cols. 1885–7, Kennedy, pp. 26–8, al.

¹³ This may be inferred from *Plin. Ep.* 2.14.9 with Sherwin-White's note, cf. also 6.6.3; Colson, xviii, unconvincingly doubts the inference.

¹⁴ Tac. *Agr.* 3.1 *nunc demum redit animus, et quamquam primo statim beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerua Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit principatum ac libertatem, augeatque felicitatem temporum Nerua Traianus* etc. But at 44.5 Trajan is called *princeps*. Cf. Syme, p. 19. The view of the *Agricola* as Tacitus' first literary publication is criticized by C. E. Murgia – see n. 15.

¹⁵ C. E. Murgia strongly argues in favour of dating the *Dialogus* before the *Agricola* in A.D. 97: 'The Date of Tacitus' *Dialogus*', *HSCP* 84 (1980), 99–125, and 'Pliny's Letters and the *Dialogus*', *HSCP* 89 (1985), 171–206. I do not go into this question here.

No 'reconstruction' can therefore be attempted, but much more can be learned about the aim, mode, and terminology of the argument than is often believed. There are three kinds of reference: (1) by full title, *De causis corruptae eloquentiae*, 'On the causes of decadent eloquence'; this occurs twice, Extracts 1 and 5 (*I.O.* 6 pr. 3, 8.6.76). One notes that *corruptus* has a moral connotation, as 'decadent' or 'ruined' has. (2) *in alio libro* or *opere*; these occur thrice, Extracts 2-4 (*I.O.* 2.4.42, 5.12.23, 8.3.58). Such are the certainties. The second kind too is certain, I note, because there is no indication of any other work by Quintilian on this subject, and because Quintilian explicitly disavowed the two books *artis rhetoricae* which were published under his name from lecture notes by members of his audience (*I.O.* 1 pr. 7-8). (3) There are also passages which, if not certain, are probable because of the key term *corrupta eloquentia* or similar notions, although no title or mention of a book appears. Probability attaches particularly to passages where arguments on the decline of oratory are mentioned together with key terms. Easily the two most important are those on education in Book 2 (*I.O.* 2.10.3) and on corrupt style in Quintilian's famous discussion of Seneca in the first chapter of Book 10 (*I.O.* 10.1.125-31). These are discussed below, but do not figure among the extracts specifically referred to by the author, and are not therefore included in the list at the end of the present paper.

III. DECLAMATION AND QUINTILIAN'S COMPROMISE

In his major work Quintilian turned aside frequently to look at the practice of declamation; M. Winterbottom has contributed an instructive selection of these asides to the memorial volume to Jean Cousin (mentioned below n. 16). But two of the references are to *alius liber* or *aliud opus*, and thus put on record that in his earlier book Quintilian had already addressed himself to discussing declamation (Extract 2) and in particular to the *scholae* in which the school-exercises, *scholastica* or *declamationes*, were taught (Extract 3). In fact the setting by which he defines *corrupta eloquentia* is precisely the *schola*, and perhaps one would not go far wrong in calling the *schola* with its *scholastica* the major cultural innovation of the first imperial century although rhetoric was of course a subject long-established in Greek and, to a certain extent, Roman education. There are several good and serviceable books on the topic of declamation,¹⁶ but no really wide analysis of this historical phenomenon, which is as fascinating as it is curious. Scholars are puzzled. The same modern handbook for example extols in one article the usefulness of declamation to practice in the imperial law courts, and in another condemns its total irrelevance.¹⁷ At Rome oratory was an important accomplishment for an official career, and never without a political aspect. Yet increasingly, whatever the politics, oratory called for rhetorical

¹⁶ Thus H. Bornecque, *Les Déclamations et les rhéteurs d'après Sénèque le père* (1902) (also his text and translation, 2nd ed. 1932); H. Bardon, *Le Vocabulaire de la critique littéraire chez Sénèque le rhéteur* (1940); E. P. Parks, *The Roman Rhetorical Schools as a Preparation for the Courts under the Early Empire* (1945); and especially S. F. Bonner, *Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire* (1949); A. D. Leeman (1963) (above n. 7), ch. 9 'Orators and rhetoricians in the Early Empire'; M. Winterbottom, *Roman Declamation* (1980) (also introd. to his text and translation of Seneca's *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae*, 1967), and the same author's papers, 'Quintilian and the Vir Bonus', *JRS* 54 (1964), 90-7, and 'Cicero and the Silver Age', *Fond. Hardt, Entret.* 28 (1981), 237-74, 'Ars Rhetorica antica e nuova', *Univ. di Genova, Fac. di lettere* (1983), 57-76, 'Quintilian and Declamation' in *Hommages à Jean Cousin*, *Inst. F. Gaffiot*, vol. 1 (n.d., apparently also 1983), 225-35; D. A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge, 1983); G. A. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton, 1972), *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton, 1983).

¹⁷ *Oxford Classical Dictionary*² (1970), F. A. G. Beck, s.v. *Education*; C. J. Fordyce, s.v. *Declamation*; but see next note.

training. Rhetoric provided a training in coherence at a level of thought that was intellectually not too demanding, yet strenuous enough to be readily applicable to public speech (in consequence influencing any speech), as far as such coherence was compatible with the political or forensic purposes of that speech. Rhetoric, underpinned by literary teaching and by a measure of logic, together with a modicum of law,¹⁸ was the staple of an education which had three main aims: coherence of argument, deliberate manipulation of emotion, and rhythm, diction, style, seeking to enhance both.

In the service of this rhetoric, but often also as virtuosity without an extraneous aim, Roman declamation developed rapidly in the first century of our era. This development culminated under Vespasian in the early seventies. His new public provision for rhetorical schooling and Quintilian's tenure of the first chair in the subject have been noted above.¹⁹ This appointment institutionalized a non-political variant to replace the originally political form of oratory that died with Cicero, when there were no *publicae scholae* and no imperial treasury to defray the cost. The new variant can hardly have failed to be acceptable to a largely autocratic monarchy because it provided a trained personnel for forensic and administrative purposes, while, at the same time, depoliticizing oratory and thus education in general. These consequences Vespasian will have seen; and it is at any rate possible that Quintilian convinced him that the rhetorician's high-minded and public-minded ethos, the width of his Ciceronian teaching, and the nobility but also sobriety of his modern yet classicizing style would serve him better than the extravagances, or simply weaknesses, of other schools. In which he would have been right.

Now returning to the two Extracts (2 and 3) from *De causis* with what may be hoped is the benefit of a wider vista, we recall that their subjects are the schools of rhetoric and the declamations there taught. From the manner in which they are cited it follows that they were discussed as major subjects in their own right. The contrary, we note, is the case in the *Institutio*. For the great work, although full of references to these two topics (I estimate about a hundred of them) never treats them in their own right as part of the layout of the rhetorical system. They always come in at a tangent, and that applies even to Book 2, on education, and 10 ch. 1, on the authors the orator must read, because 2 and 10 ch.1 are themselves tangents to the system. It is fundamental to my argument to take account of that difference.

Extract 2 comes from the attractive Book 2 of Quintilian's *Institutio*, which pronounces on education: 'On such topics as these²⁰ the ancients used to practise their rhetorical skill, but in addition they adopted the technique of argument from the masters of dialectic.²¹ For it is well established that fictitious themes resembling the

¹⁸ Or perhaps more than a modicum. For S. F. Bonner (above n. 16), p. iii, makes a case for the thesis that 'beneath the follies and extravagances of their (*sc.* the declaimers') oratorical exhibitions lay a far closer acquaintance with the Roman Law than had commonly been suspected'. Yet we would be well advised to remember M. Winterbottom's salutary warning against inferring from what he calls 'declaimers' laws' any particular relationship to real laws: Winterbottom (1983) (above n. 16), 72.

¹⁹ Above n. 6.

²⁰ The first subjects assigned to the *rhetor* are still to be in some connexion with those taught by the *grammaticus* (2.4.1). All the exercises in Quintilian 2.4 are summed up by *his* at the beginning of this Extract. Among these there is an introduction to what is called *thesis* (2.4.25-6).

²¹ The order of words in Quintilian's reference to Demetrius may seem to facilitate the view, which is occasionally expressed, that *ut alio quoque libro sum confessus* relates to *ab ipso ... inuentum*, so that a change of the author's mind from the *De causis* to the *Institutio* would be indicated by himself: 'on whether he himself invented this kind of exercise (as I acknowledged in another book), I have insufficient information.' Thus Wilamowitz, *Glaube d. Hell.* ii (1932), repr. 1955, ii.537 n. 1 - inadvertently, as K. Heldmann (1982) pointed out (below n. 48), p. 119;

(legal) subjects of the forum and (political) subjects of deliberative bodies were handled by Demetrius of Phalerum and his circle. On the question whether he himself invented this kind of exercise my information is insufficient, as I acknowledged also in another book. But not even those who maintain this strongly can rely on truly reliable evidence.' Here clearly modern declamation is set in some historical relationship with Greek philosophy and rhetoric, in particular with Demetrius of Phalerum. M. Winterbottom's observation is therefore indicated – there was an element of the *De causis* in which the provenance of declamation, and probably (because of the implied context) rhetoric as a whole, was traced.²²

Extract 3, though likewise concerned with declamation, comes from Book 5 and is thus attached to the main subject of that book – the theory and practice of proof, *probatio*. Quintilian there objects to the lack of reality which pervades the exercise as commonly taught in the schools. In making this complaint, he echoes many earlier speakers and writers of the first century.²³ And again, like many of his predecessors, Quintilian is far from demanding that declamation should be abolished. Like them he adopts a compromise: let declamation be an exercise and not an end in itself. The exercise must prepare for the aim, speeches made in the forum or addressed to a deliberative body: the forensic oratory of *controversiae* so called, or the deliberative oratory of *suasoriae* so called. The lawcourt in particular is the real thing: *ueritas*, not 'truth' but 'reality' or 'fact', he calls it with a word much favoured by Cicero.²⁴ What makes Quintilian's compromise unique in his time is the width of (Ciceronian) learning which, he maintained, was needed to achieve the aim. The *ueritas* which schools must prepare for, and which his own school clearly attempted and the *Institutio Oratoria* enshrined, requires a wide education. In this education much

correct, e.g. as Heldmann noted, in Spalding's ed. (1798); so more recent translations, also A. Reuter (1887) (below n. 38), 8. For *quoque* surely aligns the earlier book with the present: 'as I acknowledged also in another book.' For *thesis* and *controversia* see Appendix 1.

²² For the provenance of declamation see Appendix 2.

²³ The similarity is often stressed, e.g. by H. Bornecque (1902) (above n. 16), ch. 6, esp. pp. 118ff. on Cassius Severus (Sen. *Contr.* 3 pr.) and Votienus Montanus (Sen. *Contr.* 9 pr.); by S. F. Bonner (1949) (above n. 16), Ch. 4 'Declamation and its ancient critics', p. 73 on Cassius Severus, 73–4 on Votienus Montanus, and especially 80ff. on Quintilian's own views; and by later scholars. Thus too writers outside the special rhetorical field, as Petron. *Sat.* 1.2 *ui, cum in forum uenerint, putent se in alium orbem terrarum delatos*, et al.

²⁴ Thus *De or.* 3.214, on impassioned delivery; the orators are *actores ueritatis*, not 'agents in accordance with truth' but 'those who enact real life' – a kind of delivery said to be now no longer in vogue and to be taken over by the stage 'actors', who are merely *imitatores...ueritatis*. (215) *ac sine dubio in omni re uincit imitationem ueritas*. Cf. Wilkins ad loc., Leeman–Pinkster, *De or.* 1.77n. This is one of the Ciceronian notions that much impressed Quintilian in very different political circumstances. Though much favoured by Cicero, this idiomatic usage of *ueritas* appears before him, applied to actual pleading, at *Ad Her.* 4.32 *cum in ueritate dicimus*, 'when we speak in an actual case', as opposed to the oratory of mere display, *epideixis*. This, according to the TLL archives, is the earliest Latin instance of the special idiom on record, but the noun *ueritas* happens to be infrequent before *Ad Her.* and Cicero anyway. The adj. *uerus*, however, is common in the sense 'real, actual'; see OLD s.v. *uerus*. The idiomatic usage is paralleled by Greek ἀληθής, ἀλήθεια, as the dict. show. Although a direct borrowing from the Greek in a rhetorical context cannot be excluded, direct dependence of the general Latin idiom, 'real, actual', is unlikely. (The special rhetorical application of ἀληθής, ἀλήθεια is noted by J. C. T. Ernesti in *Lex. tech. Gr. rhet.*, 12, with reference to Dion. Hal. *Demosth.* ch. 32.1056.)

It is not surprising that *ueritas* often appears in passages of Quintilian where he argues what above I have called his compromise: declamation is to be approved only if it prepares for the 'reality' of forensic or deliberative oratory. Thus above in the text of 5.12.22, and 2.20.4, 8.3.23, 10.2.12 in *illis* (sc. *orationibus*) *uera*, in *his* (sc. *declamationibus*) *assimulata materia est*, 10.5.14, 17 in *falsa rerum imagine* in contrast with 21 in *declamando quam simillimum esse ueritati*, et al. Occasionally however Quintilian uses *uerum* and *ueritas* for 'truth': 2.10.12, al.

Graeco-Roman theory underpins an essentially Roman and practical aim. The combination made the great effort seem worthwhile – for a time.

This is how he describes his complex aim in Extract 3. ‘The young man whom we are teaching should address himself, as far as he possibly can, to copying the model, imitating the real thing (*componat se ad imitationem ueritatis*). He will have to enter many battles in the courts; so let him look for victory in the schools, let him learn to pierce the heart of his opponent (*ferire uitalia*) and protect his own.’ This, he goes on, is what the teacher must guide him to. ‘But nowadays the trouble is that the teacher tends to pass over in silence what is essential (*necessaria*), and the practical purpose of it all, *utilitas*, is no longer reckoned a value.’ Then there follows the reference to the *De causis* (again the second of our types of reference). ‘But we have discussed these matters in another work and must repeat them frequently in this.’ The transitional formula that follows (*nunc ad ordinem inceptum*) reminds us, here and elsewhere, that, as I have argued, what is a digression in the *Institutio* was a main subject in the *De causis*. Such is the end of the long extract, which carries the actual reference. But the extract is much longer and we must return to it presently.

IV. LICENCE AND IGNORANCE

Before doing so, I propose to intensify Quintilian’s criticism of the schools by recalling a passage which does not figure among the listed extracts because it lacks a direct reference to its source. But it stands to reason that its terminology, and more than its terminology, come from the *De causis*. It ties together the two basic terms *causae* and *corrupta eloquentia* and hence, I think, it belongs to the third form of reference, which is putative only. Declamation, Quintilian demands in the first discussion it receives in the *Institutio* (2.10.3) should be as close to the real thing, *ueritas* again, as can be, and the *ueritas* is of course forensic. But the teachers, he complains, do not focus on that. They divagate and luxuriate in their choice and treatment of topics – which he calls self-indulgence, *licentia*; and they themselves do not know enough for the task they undertake – which he calls plain ignorance, *inscitia*. ‘Through the fault of the teachers (*culpa docentium*) things have come to such a pass that the licence and ignorance of the declaimers must be reckoned among the chief causes that have ruined oratory’ (‘ut inter praecipuas quas **corrumperent eloquentiam causas** licentia atque inscitia declamantium fuerit’). These words paraphrase the title of the *De causis* in the spirit and manner of the actual reference which we have already seen in Extract 3. Declamation is justified if it prepares for *ueritas*, but demands a great deal of self-denial and learning. Then it is good, otherwise bad: *eo quod natura bonum est, bene uti licet* (I.O. 2.10.3). We would not be far wrong therefore in describing *licentia* and *ignorantia* or *inscitia* as corresponding terms from the *De causis*, though often found in the *Institutio*. His own proposals on how to deal with these ills are the positive counterpart to the criticisms of the *De causis* and are likely therefore to have been mooted there as well. We note that *licentia* has a primarily moral ring – a motif pursued after the *De causis* in the *Institutio*.²⁵ But *inscitia* or *ignorantia* is of course mainly intellectual: it is Ciceronian learning, not excluding legal, which is at stake: its opposite at 2.14.23 is *omnium artium peritia*. Yet

²⁵ At 7.10.6–7 the word *licentia* is not actually used and *ignorantia* is but alluded to, although he talks of wilfulness in the arrangement of a subject, e.g. *cum fuerit de prima quaestione dicendum, passim et ut quidque in mentem ueniet miscuerit*, etc. But in the treatment of simile and comparison, 8.3.76, he says, *quod quidem genus a quibusdam declamatoria maxime licentia corruptum est*.

a moral element is not entirely absent and is linked with the 'licence' that considers itself above the reality it professes to deal with.

For the moral implication of declaiming we need also to look at the rest of the long passage in Book 5.12, which so far has been mentioned only as Extract 3 because it ends by overtly citing the *De causis*. In fact, however, the whole piece from §17 (second sentence) to 23, the end of the chapter, is marked off as a digression, and both its content and its main terminology fall, as it were, under that reference to the earlier work. Here the moral note is unmistakable. Once declamation ceased to be a training with foils to prepare for real fights with swords – that is, forensic cases – , it became an end in itself, an artistic performance, whose object was to titillate by soft elegance. The basic metaphor throughout is virility, Roman fighting strength, but the fight is forensic. So nature is thought to ordain; it seems laid down by natural law. Nature has given to the male sex strength, muscular force, etc. If you dispense with the fighting spirit of the exercise, nothing but faulty style remains, a smooth skin as it were: *habitus ipsum orationis uirilem et illam uim stricte robusteque dicendi tenera quadam elocutionis cute operimus*. There is a revealing comparison of a sexual kind (§17): just as slave-dealers castrate boys for the market, seeking to replace strength and muscle by softness and smooth elegance, so declaimers deprive speech of the innate strength that comes from having a fighting purpose in life. Sexual and generally physical metaphors go back a long way in discussions of style, but play a major part in earlier debates on Asianism and Atticism.²⁶ One is reminded also of literary debate by a philosophically inclined poet and satirist like Persius.

A *Beilage* to the second volume of Wilamowitz's *Der Glaube der Hellenen* surveys ancient complaints about the decline of oratory in Greece and Rome.²⁷ The author remarks that there will have been contemporaries who were able to perceive the decline, and understand its causes. 'The title *de causis corruptae eloquentiae* gives the impression that Quintilian had explained these historical connexions in that book; but what he repeats from the earlier book in his main work amounts to stylistic observations. He discussed the tricks and tendencies of style that had caused the moderns to leave the classical Ciceronian style behind, and it was Cicero's style to which he wished to guide his disciples back.' What Wilamowitz said about the Ciceronian aims of Quintilian's teaching is certainly true. He also strikes me as right in recognizing Quintilian's success in his own style; he called Quintilian 'Meister edelster Prosa'.²⁸ But we have already seen that he was off the mark in restricting the 'causation' of the *De causis* solely to stylistic considerations.²⁹ It is true that the

²⁶ Masculine strength in contrast with (objectionable) female softness of style amounts to a motif in Quintilian. Thus 8.3.6 *sed hic ornatus (repetam enim) uirilis et fortis et sanctus sit nec effeminatam leuitatem et fuco ementitum colorem amet: sanguine et uiribus niteat*, cf. 9.4.142, al. This tone is familiar from Augustan Atticism. Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 23.112 (on polished or smooth composition, γλαφυρὸν εὐφωὰ τε εἶναι βούλεται πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ λεία καὶ παρθενωπά, τραχεῖαις δὲ συλλαβαῖς καὶ ἀντιτύποι ἀπέχθεται πού, κτλ. Cf. *Isocr.* 13.560. The metaphor in this kind of context is certainly much older than Augustan Atticism. Thus Philod. *Rhet.* i.198 (Sudhaus) citing Hieronymus of Rhodes, a Peripatetic of the 3rd century B.C. (*Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Hieron, fr. 52a and b, Wehrli), criticizing Isocrates' unvaried smoothness: τὸ δὲ κεκλασμένον... ἀποβεβληκέναι, τῇ δὲ λειότητι διὰ παντὸς δουλεύει.

²⁷ Wilamowitz op. cit. (above n. 21), ii.537.

²⁸ op. cit. 442. It is of some interest to notice how much Wilamowitz's appreciation of Quintilian had grown from, say, the famous paper, 'Asianismus und Attizismus' published in 1900. There (*Kl. Schr.* 3, 246) Quintilian is a rhetorician 'well intentioned but flat' – 'dem wohlmeinenden aber flachen Rhetor'.

²⁹ Wilamowitz op. cit. and Reuter (below n. 38), 57, though qualified 60, narrowly restrict Quintilian's causation to style. This view was rejected, quite rightly, by H. Drexler in his

causae lead to corrupt style. Yet the themes of forum over against scholastic declamation, forensic *ueritas* over against scholastic unreality and licence, Ciceronian learning with its own brand of philosophy over against the ignorance of those who professed to teach declamation – these we have demonstrated to be subjects of the *De causis*, not primarily related to style. They still survive in the *Institutio* – had they not we would fail to know about them – but they are there, built into the overall design of a comprehensive rhetorical system. In the *De causis* they were topics in their own right, indeed the chief topics. That must have been the main reason for its contemporary interest, and some of that interest can still be perceived in what little remains of the work.

V. CACOEZELIA

This is the point where, in Quintilian's view, declamation loses its *raison d'être*, and here style enters the picture. As we have seen in Extract 3 – with nothing purposeful and strong to say, an empty seeking for soft stylistic elegance replaces the lost purpose. Clearly, this discussion wholly differs from the systematic treatment of style as a predetermined part of rhetoric which we find in the *Institutio*: Greek *phrasis* or Latin *elocutio*, and ornaments of speech, as they are called, in particular.³⁰

The key term for discussion of style in the *De causis* appears to have been 'affectation'. This term translates *mala affectatio*, which in turns renders Greek *cacozelon*. Its discussion in the *Institutio* (8.3.56ff.) is explicitly based on the earlier book; I am referring to Extract 4 (*I.O.* *ibid.* 58), where *cacozelia* is declared a corruption of speech. Quintilian adds, *sed de hac parte et in alio nobis opere plenius dictum est et in hac saepe tractatum et adhuc spargetur omnibus locis*. 'Affectation' is a highly interesting term; *cacozelon* appears to be Hellenistic, and may well be colloquial in origin: Demetrius (*De elocutione*, 186) talks of κοινὸν ὄνομα. This is scarcely 'the name commonly given to it' (Grube), because Demetrius emphasizes that it is he who applies it;³¹ 'current name' (Roberts) is more likely, but in the sense that the word was widely used. Wilamowitz perceptively noticed the original width of the word: it was not at first restricted to style.³² This is certainly unmistakable in Demetrius' main discussion of κακόζηλον (187–9), for there he finds affectation in thought, words, and stylistic structure, while yet reserving the term for one of his stylistic categories only – the smooth or elegant style, γλαφυρόν. The narrow stylistic notion, which excludes *res* and *compositio*, may not be older than Augustan classicism, but even there secure instances are hard to come by.³³ Certainly among extant writers Quintilian seems to be almost alone in restricting the term to diction: 8.3.56 *est autem totum in elocutione*.

Hence *cacozelon* was a particularly useful term for his critique of declamatory rhetoric because he held that declamation had lost its link with subject matter, reality,

important survey of earlier Tacitean research, *Jahresber. f. Altertumsw.* 229, Suppl. 1929, 271–3, also by R. Güngerich, *Gn.* 27 (1955), 440, and G. Brugnoli, *Orpheus* 6 (1959), 36–7; they did not, however, draw appropriate conclusions from these observations, nor did they persuade many scholars that the observations are in fact just.

³⁰ Quint. *I.O.* Books 8–9, the former on diction and style, the latter on figures of thought and style, also on structure and rhythm.

³¹ At 186 ὀνομάζω is Gale's necessary correction for -ει cod.P.

³² For κακόζηλία see Appendix 3.

³³ Two famous Augustan instances may be cases in point – Augustus ap. Suet. *Aug.* 86 and the Donatus *Vita Verg.* 44 – but are too brief and epigrammatic to be much use in this context. On the other hand it has been noted (thus by Wilamowitz, Rhys Roberts, and Grube) that, surprisingly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not use the term.

and nature. The faults he sees covered by stylistic affectation are manifold – anything turgid, puny, oversweet, redundant, far-fetched, and extravagant, in fact anything ‘unnatural’, *aliter quam se natura habet* (58), to which he adds, characteristically, *et quam oportet* (social propriety) *et quam sat est* (classical aesthetic propriety). It is good qualities (*uirtutes*) carried to excess, because the mind loses its critical edge (*iudicium*) and is taken in by what appears to be good (*specie boni*), the worst of all faults in speaking (ib. 56). This is the well-known doctrine of adjacent faults, Hellenistic in origin and much made of in Horace’s *Ars Poetica*.³⁴ He ends by saying ‘speech is corrupted’ – *corrumpitur*: remember the title of the *De causis* – ‘in as many ways as it is embellished’ (*ornatur*) – and there follows the reference to *aliud opus* which I noted earlier.

Affectation defined by natural law also forms the link with the last named extract (5). This concerns hyperbole, a great virtue when the subject itself exceeds ‘natural measure’. *naturalem modum*, meaning that it is a fault when the excess is in the style only.³⁵ There metaphysics of nature and emphasis on subject matter overriding form go together. The latter therefore will have been a component of the *De causis*. We have seen it already in Extract 3. The opposition to artistic speech as an end in itself is marked. It sounds almost like a sophisticated paraphrase of old Cato’s *rem tene, uerba sequuntur*, perhaps with a glance at Horace’s own version of it in the *Ars Poetica*.³⁶ But there are more traces of it in the *Institutio* than these three where *aliud opus* or *De causis* is explicitly quoted, and in two of them quoted with the warning *et in hoc* (sc. *opere*) *saepe repetenda*, or *et in hoc saepe tractatum (est) et adhuc spargetur omnibus locis*. Thus in the wide-ranging proem to Book 8 with his commendation of Cicero’s stress on ‘ordinary speech’ (25) and his criticism of the modern contempt for *omne quod natura dictauit*, directed against all of us *qui non ornamenta quaerimus sed lenocinia* (26). In fact the whole proem is nothing but a variation on the *uerba sequuntur*-theme, as he sums up at the end: ‘style requires the greatest possible care, so long as we remember that nothing should be undertaken for the sake of the words only, because words were invented to express things’ (32). The same concern appears in the early part of ch. 3 introducing the extract on affectation (4), directed as it is against the *corrupti* (8.3.7) and their over-fine writing. While it is impossible to delimit the actual borrowing without a specific reference, the thought and much of the wording clearly comes from the *De causis*, but reappears without overt reference to the book or to the original context, which was opposition to the modern type of declamation.

VI. SENECA AND CORRUPT STYLE

The most interesting of what look like indirect allusions to the *De causis* by technical terms but not by book-title is Quintilian’s apologia in respect of Seneca and his own earlier opinion of him. This comes in the famous first chapter of Book 10 on the *optimi auctores* whose works the budding orator is instructed to read; it is placed, deliberately he tells us, right at the end (125–31). Seneca is now said to be a great author with a remarkable range. His genius cannot be doubted. But his style is ‘corrupt’, ‘decadent’, his writings are ‘full of sweet faults’ (129 *dulcibus uititiis*). *Ingenium* he has; *iudicium* he has not. This classical view of *ingenium* and *iudicium* is close to Quintilian’s very similar judgement of Ovid; and it comes out here in the curious wish that Seneca should have allowed his genius to be guided by the

³⁴ I refer particularly to *Horace on Poetry* ii.105–13.

³⁵ Quint. *I.O.* 8.6.76.

³⁶ Hor. *A.P.* 311 *uerbaque prouisam rem non inuita sequuntur*.

judgement of others (130), the kind of guidance ascribed by Horace to Quintilius Varus, his 'Aristarchus', in the *Ars Poetica* (438).

Two opposed conclusions have been drawn from the remarks with which Quintilian introduces this Seneca section (125): 'In every literary genre I have omitted Seneca quite deliberately, postponing him to this final place because of the view, erroneous but widely held, that I condemn Seneca and actually detest him. That view of my opinion was formed when I attempted to subject to the discipline of stricter standards of style that had gone wholly bad and was riddled with every kind of fault (*dum corruptum et omnibus uitiiis fractum dicendi genus reuocare ad seueriora iudicia contendo*). But at that time he was almost the only writer approved by the young.' Then he goes on to censure the taste of the young generation when he taught, which, as he puts it, 'was so far below Seneca as he himself was below the ancients', and that approval was an approval of his faults (126-7).

I have said that two views of this passage have been taken. Either, it is thought, we have here a covert reference to the *De causis corruptae eloquentiae* – covert because it is not by its title or *in alio opere* but by the key term, *corruptum ... dicendi genus*, which may be thought to be not unduly concealed. This is received opinion, expressed for example by A. D. Leeman.³⁷ Or else, it is thought, we have here a general reference to Quintilian's teaching, since the earlier work is not explicitly mentioned, and further since we have no indubitable evidence that he opposed by name any speaker or writer. This view has been held by few, most strongly by August Reuter in his useful doctoral dissertation on the *De causis*.³⁸ The two views do not wholly exclude each other. There is clearly something in both of them, simply because the evidence happens to be disparate. On the one hand, *dum corruptum ... dicendi genus reuocare ad seueriora iudicia contendo* would fit Quintilian's protracted activities as a teacher. This is likely to be even more the case, because, as Dr M. Winterbottom points out to me, and as I note myself below in a different context (p. 493), Quintilian's reference to Seneca's popularity – 125 *tum autem solus hic fere in manibus adulescentium fuit* – suits an early period better than a time as recent as A.D. 89, the likely date of *De causis*, when conditions had changed. On the other hand, terms like *corruptum et omnibus uitiiis fractum dicendi genus*, an aim expressed by *reuocare ad seueriora iudicia*, and a criticism like *rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis (frangere)*, seem to point precisely to the concerns of the *De causis*. The disparate evidence cannot be resolved except by the conclusion that both references have a partial justification. Quintilian's primary reference is to an early period in his teaching when Senecanism was rife. But the *De causis* can scarcely have failed to repeat the former teacher's and present author's opposition to this particular brand of *cacozelia*.

This solution would also explain the misunderstanding against which Quintilian is here defending himself. The misunderstanding will have been caused by his attack, in the *De causis*, on the style of the young contemporary imitators of Seneca's faults, rather than *nominatim* as it were, against the great man himself. He tells us about his

³⁷ A. D. Leeman (1963) (above n. 7), i.278, with nn. 123 and 124 in ii.477-8. Others, in the last three decades or so, who have seen a reference to the *De causis* in Quintilian's remark on Seneca, although varying in their opinions on other features, are G. Brugnoli (1959) (above n. 29), T. Gelzer, *MH* 27 (1970), 212-23, K. Heldmann (1980) (below n. 48), pp. 12-19. Heldmann also raises strong points against Gelzer's treatment of Quintilian's passage as a case of rhetorical *simulatio*.

³⁸ A. Reuter, *De Quintiliani libro qui fuit De causis corr. eloq.* (Diss., Göttingen, 1887), which owed much to the teaching of Wilamowitz. The specific reference is to pp. 30-1. Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* 2¹ (1935), p. 748, and W. Trillitzsch, *Seneca im lit. Urteil d. Antike* i (1971), p. 62, follow suit.

arguments: *corruptum dicendi genus* (of the young *soi-disant* Senecans); *seueriora iudicia* (the classical criteria of Cicero's style); and the 'attractive faults', especially the fashion of the day, which he derived from Seneca, when 'the weight of subjects was split up into tiny epigrams' (130 *si rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis non fregisset*). This carries the same moral objection against trivializing matters he regarded as serious, and a call to replace a trivial obsession with style by a proper attention to what a Roman orator's style should express: *rem tene, uerba sequentur* in Cato's language.

VII. THE HYPOTHESES OF WILAMOWITZ AND K. BARWICK CONCERNING QUINTILIAN'S *DE CAUSIS* AND TACITUS' *DIALOGUS*. THE NOTION OF AETIOLOGY

Most of what we now read about the subject of Quintilian and Tacitus, however divergent in opinion, is an outcome of two hypotheses – Wilamowitz's, though now all but forgotten, and Barwick's, surviving in various attenuated shapes.

Wilamowitz conceived his hypothesis early and held it nearly all his working life, certainly from 1883 onwards in Göttingen, where it stimulated the doctoral dissertation by August Reuter (1887) mentioned above, to 'Asianismus und Attizismus', the rightly celebrated essay of 1900, and finally to *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (1932). In 1900 he said, 'Es sollte einleuchten, dass Tacitus den Dialog *geschrieben hat*' (my italics), 'als er das Bild, das ihm Quintilian in seiner Streitschrift vorführte, mit den Augen des Historikers überschaute, unmittelbar dadurch angeregt, natürlich aber, wie ein antiker Historiker pflegt, den Stoff und die Gedanken des Gelehrten übernehmend... Ausserdem hat dem Tacitus die Einleitung des ciceronischen Hortensius viel geliefert' etc. In the version of 1932 he changed 'geschrieben hat', more circumspectly, to 'den Anstoss erhielt ... zu schreiben'; 'he felt the impulse to write'.³⁹ Even so it will be seen that there were two diverse notions rolled into one: a biographical assertion about the genesis of the *Dialogus*, and an assertion about the reliance of the *Dialogus* on the unnamed *De causis*, but more importantly the basic disagreement of one author with the other. However intriguing the biographical guess, it is hard to make it stick; at best it may be so, but it may also be otherwise. On the other hand, his assertion about the relationship of the two works is capable, even upon our restricted evidence, of verification – or falsification. Beyond that there was little need for Wilamowitz, in his context, to go into detail.⁴⁰

K. Barwick does not (to my knowledge) refer to his great predecessor in these

³⁹ The first passage comes from Wilamowitz, 'Asianismus und Attizismus', *Hermes* 35 (1900), 25 n. 1, repr. *Kl. Schr.* iii.246 n. 1, the second from *D. Glaube d. Hell.* (cit. above n. 21), ii.537. Wilamowitz was a man of strong intuitions; his perception of intellectual and artistic development was acute and often unquestionably right. Not always, however. An interesting case, also as it happens concerned with the development of historical sense (Lorenzo Valla's in that case), where biographical simplification overrode attention to evidence, was pointed out by R. Pfeiffer, *Hist. of Class. Scholarship* i.39, *Ausg. Schr.* (1960), p. 164, criticizing Wilamowitz, *Reden u. Vortr.*⁴ (1926), p. 115, *Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 12.

⁴⁰ What little detail was mentioned by Wilamowitz desirably widened the subject. He did not, however, face the problem of the *Institutio* as a possible source for Tacitus in addition to the *De causis*; the matter is to be discussed below. And he was too hasty in claiming style as Quintilian's only *causa* for *corrupta eloquentia*. We have seen that there were several *causae* – an important point for what I believe was Tacitus' reaction to his aetiology. On the other hand he was by no means unaware of the difference between the rhetorician's *corrupta eloquentia* in the *De causis*, and the reduced eloquence for the causes of which Tacitus professes to search in the *Dialogus*.

researches. This may be largely due to his different approach to the subject, although ultimately he came to conclusions that resembled his predecessor's main postulate. Intellectually he was not perhaps one of the outstanding scholars of his time, but he was a highly competent observer of philological evidence and, unlike Wilamowitz, sought to obtain proof of quite separate propositions in this area. He published three papers on Tacitus and Quintilian, which, though not faultless, have proved basic to any work on this topic.⁴¹ But he was happier in dealing with Quintilian than with Tacitus, and an undue element of simplification gave rise to various misunderstandings which I have attempted to resolve in this paper.

There is however one piece of evidence of which, perhaps surprisingly, Wilamowitz did not avail himself at all, and Barwick did so insufficiently. I am referring to the different aims of Quintilian's two works.

The title of his earlier book aptly begins *De causis*. The nature of the *De causis* is aetiological, causative, by definition, and its aim is to determine the causes of *corrupta eloquentia*, though doubtless with the ulterior purpose of thus laying a foundation for the author's renewed Ciceronianism. The primary aim of the *Dialogus* too is aetiological, even, in a sense, more markedly so, since Tacitus had no such ulterior neo-Ciceronian purpose. Here then we find a primary likeness between *De causis* and *Dialogus*. It is this likeness which has to be set against the general subject of both – rhetorical and educational theory – and their specific subjects – decadent eloquence in one case and decline of oratory, *tout court*, in the other. Moreover the unique standing of Quintilian's teachings, not only under the Flavian emperors but, after his death, under Nerva and Trajan, has to be allowed for. The argument is that in the *Dialogus* Tacitus opposed Quintilian, upturning as it were the aetiology of the *De causis*, but excluding, as has already been stated, any direct reference in the dramatic situation of the dialogue.

Now contrast Quintilian's later book, the massive *Institutio*. This is a textbook, which enshrines the neo-Ciceronianism into which the polemics of *De causis* will have issued, and summarized his neo-Ciceronian teaching within the confines of a vast rhetorical system. Hence I have argued that, despite some tangential references to 'causes' of discontents in oratory, it is neither necessary nor even possible to deduce from them the fully-fledged aetiology which we see deployed in the *Dialogus* and the remains of the *De causis*.

It is here that some important researches of the time after Wilamowitz's hypothesis, and simultaneous with Barwick, need to be considered. In 1958 R. Syme summed them up as follows: 'The *Dialogus* carried echoes of the *Institutio Oratoria*, and closely similar verdicts about Latin literature. Various strains of dissent can also be

⁴¹ K. Barwick (1) (1913), *RhM* 68, 279–85, largely, though not entirely, succeeded in determining the size of the lacuna at chs. 35–6 of the *Dialogus*; he returned to the question later to defend his position against protesters. The result is important, because a lacuna of this size would not accommodate a set speech by Secundus, on which in turn the layout of the speeches depends. (2) 1929, in *Festschrift W. Judeich* (Weimar), pp. 81–108, his best contribution to this subject, and indispensable for further consideration. Two results stand out: his comparison of the Messala speeches, *Dial.* chs. 28ff. on rhetorical education, theory, and practice, with Quintilian, especially *De causis*, and, secondly, his analysis of the layout of all the speeches in the *Dialogus*. But, as noted above, the work is not faultless. His statements on the Tacitean side of the account, which resulted in the simplistic formula 'Messala–Quintilian', followed by 'Maternus–Tacitus', are erroneous and have caused much confusion. (3) 1954, 'Der *Dialogus* de oratoribus des Tacitus', in *Berichte ... der sächs. Ak. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig*, phil.-hist. Kl. 101.4, p. 42. This essay usefully places his earlier findings in a wider framework, but the same simplistic tendency mars it in certain places.

detected.⁴² That there are possible similarities is recognized even by those who are not disposed to accept all parallels that have been claimed.⁴³ Barwick himself took it for granted that the basic use of the *De causis* does not militate against a secondary use of the *Institutio* in some cases. Such cases however will have to be judged on their merit. They do not exhibit the basic aetiological approach which Quintilian adopted in the *De causis* and Tacitus restated in the *Dialogus* chiefly for purposes of a not very concealed polemic against Quintilian.

If then sole reliance of *Dialogus* on *Institutio* is excluded, a corollary, unavoidable though uncomfortable, would seem to follow; in most cases it is just impossible to prove that Quintilian's later work does not, in some way or other, duplicate the argument of the earlier. It is surprising, for that reason, that the *De causis* has receded so much from the modern vista. In the normal kind of instance where we observe Tacitus covertly agreeing, or more likely disagreeing with Quintilian, we have to reckon with both *De causis* and *Institutio* as possible sources.⁴⁴ It is only in a rare instance like Extract 2 that we find a hint at a possible difference between the two works – and even there ill luck will have it that Quintilian did not in fact change his mind, as some scholars actually thought he had done.⁴⁵

With these constraints in mind we can now turn to Tacitus' own *causae* in the dialogue which puts Quintilian (unnamed) in his place, as it puts other authorities in theirs.

VIII. VIPSTANUS MESSALA

A search for evidence of Quintilian in Tacitus' *Dialogus* needs to begin with Messala's two speeches on education (chs. 28–32 and 33–5, which turn out to be a single speech subdivided). A search needs so to begin, because most, though not all, scholars here acknowledge some kind of Quintilianic evidence, and an attempt should be made to ascertain whether this acknowledgement is safe. Another reason is that in those chapters, at last, after nearly two-thirds of the work (after 26 out of 42 OCT pages), what looks like the main subject comes to be discussed – and this is the topic to which

⁴² R. Syme, *Tacitus* i (1958), p. 114, and bibliography in n. 9, beginning with R. Dienen's long paper, *WS* 37 (1915), 239–71, which still, painstakingly, had to prove a post-Quintilianean date for the *Dialogus*. Later scholars, from H. Bardon, *REL* 19 (1941), 113–31, onwards, had an easier row to hoe; they could confront *Institutio* and *Dialogus* in more straightforward terms; cf. references in G. Kennedy, *op. cit.* (above n. 1), ch. 6 n. 13, to which add F. Kühnert, 'Quintilians Stellung zu d. Beredsamkeit seiner Zeit', *Listy Fil.* 57 (1964), 33–50, based on his Jena dissertation of 1951, *Die Tendenz in Quintilians Institutio Oratoria*, which remained unpublished, and which I have not seen in typescript. The relation between *Institutio* and *Dialogus* was discussed by R. Güngerich in a brief and acute paper, 'D. Dial. des Tac. und Quint. I.O.', *CP* 46 (1951), 159–64. Güngerich however is not there concerned with the *De causis*.

⁴³ C. E. Murgia, *HSCP* 84 (1984), 100–1 with n. 10.

⁴⁴ I find it hard therefore to accept Murgia's suggestion, *loc. cit.* (preceding note), that the parallels between *Institutio* and *Dialogus* by their quantity and distribution render 'untenable a theory that the *Dialogus* and the *Institutio* simply share a common source (such as an earlier work of Quintilian)'. Since the evidence as I see it points to the *De causis* as a source for Tacitus, the other two works (I mean *Dialogus* and *Institutio*), *pace* Murgia, do share a common source, but the sharing is not simple, since Tacitus is not unlikely to have drawn on the *Institutio* as well.

⁴⁵ The point that caused Quintilian here to mention his first work concerns Demetrius of Phalerum: above pp. 475–6. But the rhetorical context renders it likely that the conjunction of the Greek *factae materiae* with the early Latin *rhetoires* figured in the first work as well. Also there is no reason to guess that he refrained from muffling Cicero's condemnation of those early *rhetoires* in the *De causis* (Extract 2), but did so muffle it in the corresponding passage, *I.O.* 2.4.42. After all he had a prejudice in favour of declamation then as well as later, although he well knew the drawbacks of the genre. Contrast Tac. *Dial.* 35.1 with Quintilian, *De causis* Extract 2, and consider Güngerich's observation, *loc. cit.* (above n. 42), 163.

Quintilianic material, if there be any, should relate. What looks like the main subject, we may remind ourselves, was stated in *Dial.* Ch. 1 as follows: why, *cur*, has the quality of oratory declined in our time? The question receives an explicit answer in Messala's summary at 32. 5–7; that, in a strict sense, is the only answer it receives. For Maternus' historical cause, though rightly celebrated, is an answer only in a manner of speaking. Its main function in the composition of the *Dialogus* appears to be to refute Messala's *causa* by implication, just as, again by implication, it refutes Aper's quasi-case in the first part of the work, although, obviously, it has other purposes as well.

From these facts alone it follows, as it was noted on other grounds before, that Quintilianic opinions need not imply that Tacitus agreed with them. They only need to imply that one of his *personae dialogi* is made to put them forward for reasons that presumably accord with his share of the argument and with the character he is made to display in the *Dialogus*. Whether Messala so restates, in some way or other, Quintilian's teaching on education as far as relates to oratory, has been frequently debated for about a century. Answers have ranged from wholesale approval, which resulted in the now familiar formula 'Messala-Quintilian'⁴⁶ to qualified acceptance,⁴⁷ to complete rejection.⁴⁸ This diversity arises, I suggest, not from the nature of the evidence, but because too many questions have been asked at one and the same time. In view of the difference between two disputants – Messala as portrayed by Tacitus, and Quintilian as he speaks in his own books – it is probably an error even to attempt to reduce the problem to a single question. It is surely more practicable, and indeed more critical, to allow the different questions to remain on their different and separate levels. We ask, therefore, (1) how much recorded Quintilianic doctrine can be identified in Messala's educational speeches; but also, on the other hand, (2) whether there are serious doctrinal disagreements between Tacitus' Messala and Quintilian; and, on that basis, (3) whether any such evidence of Quintilian as can be identified in Tacitus is more likely to point to the *De causis* than to the *Institutio*. At that stage, but scarcely before, it could be useful to raise yet another question; (4) how far can it be determined that the choice and presentation of known theories (such as Messala's argument on education in oratory) are influenced by Tacitus' wider historical and literary purposes?

⁴⁶ I here select Reuter (above n. 38), 40–1, 58–60; G. Wormser, *Rev. Phil.* 36 (1912), especially 187–9; R. Dienel *W.S.* 37 (1915), e.g. 235; Drexler (above n. 29), 227; K. Barwick (above n. 41, 1929), 81–90, the basic discussion on Messala and Quintilian, and 106–8, on the layout of the *Dialogus*; K. Keyssner, *Würzburger St. z. Altertumsw.* 9 (1936), 107; H. Bardou, *R.E.L.* 19 (1941), especially 119–27; Barwick (above n. 41, 1954), which sets the author's observations of 1929 in a wider context. The formula 'Messala-Quintilian' appears e.g. at Wormser, loc. cit., Barwick, (n. 41, 1954), 15, 17.

⁴⁷ Thus e.g. W. den Boer, *Mnem.* 3.7 (1939), 209–11; Güngerich (above n. 29), loc. cit., and on Tac. *Dial.* 30.1; R. Häussler, *Philol.* 113 (1969), 49–50 (but, at p. 47, he convincingly extols Barwick's merit in clarifying the outlines of the *Dialogus* as a whole); K. Bringmann, *MH* 27 (1970), especially pp. 172–4.

⁴⁸ Kennedy (above n. 1), pp. 22–4, 136–9, especially p. 138; even more emphatic, K. Heldmann, *Poetica* 12 (1980), 1–23, especially 19–21, and (1982) (München), *Antike Theorien üb. Entwick. und Verfall d. Redekunst*, especially 213–54, 255–86. At *Poetica* 12, 19 Heldmann says that Quintilian's 'indications are so scanty that there is no sense in any attempt at reconstruction'. I agree, the evidence is insufficient for a 'reconstruction'; see above p. 474. But I seek to demonstrate in this paper that it is possible nevertheless to know something substantial about the *De causis*, without reconstructing the lost work. Nor is the basic disagreement of Tacitus' Messala (who seems to regard the decline of oratory and the other arts as irretrievable) with Quintilian (who sees the decline but hopes to check it) a sufficient reason for excluding Tacitus' use, for largely polemical purposes, of Quintilian, as Heldmann appears to argue; cf. below n. 72.

(1) K. Barwick made two basic observations on Quintilian in the Messala context, which, though frequently mentioned in agreement or disagreement, have not been used to advantage. In the first place Barwick observed that Messala's educational Ciceronianism is more Quintilianic than the overt references to Cicero make the reader suspect; this is a line to be pursued further. In the second place Barwick was able to explain how such a Quintilianic element in the Messala speeches may be related to the rest of the *Dialogus* – another point to take up later.⁴⁹

Quintilian and Tacitus' Messala agree first of all that the student of oratory stands in need of more than a ready tongue and a few tricks of the trade which the ordinary teacher of rhetoric considered sufficient – that in fact he must have an education. The principles and standards by which Messala judges such an education are largely Quintilian's.

It is scarcely worth saying that neither Quintilian nor Tacitus' Messala could accept that total failure of creative talent which was not rarely invoked in the first imperial century as causing a decline of oratory or of the arts generally.⁵⁰ Nor was there any disagreement between them on the immediate cause of decline – namely low standards of learning – and on what was taken to be the ultimate cause – a failure of moral principle.⁵¹ This is not perhaps surprising in view of the general agreement claimed by Messala – *quae omnes sentimus* (28.1) –, and the alleged faults are vague, general, and conventional: idleness of the young, indifference of parents, ignorance of teachers.⁵²

Such agreements in generalities as there are may be noted. But greater significance will attach to more specific resemblances, and to none more than to the commitment of Tacitus' Messala to Quintilian's ideal of oratorical education. That ideal constitutes their most significant likeness, for which it has to be borne in mind that Quintilian's name (as a contemporary's name at the dramatic date of the dialogue) is not of course mentioned. I am referring to Ciceronianism in Quintilian's doctrine. Quintilian set up Cicero's universality in public oratory as an educational aim – a wide general culture⁵³ as basis for a strenuous oratorical technique, to serve the purposes of state

⁴⁹ Barwick, 1929 and 1954, above n. 46. For Barwick on the relation between the Messala speeches and the rest of the *Dialogus*, see below p. 498.

⁵⁰ Quint. *I.O.* 1.1.1 *falsa est enim querela paucissimis hominibus uim percipiendi quae tradantur esse concessam, plerosque uero laborem ac tempora tarditate ingenii perdere*, etc.; Tac. *Dial.* 28.2 *quis enim ignorat et eloquentiam et ceteras artes descivisse ab illa uetere gloria non inopia hominum, sed* etc. This agreement between the teacher, Quintilian, and the idealizer of republican oratory, Messala, is on the surface only, since their aims differ. The arguments on the decline of oratory in the first imperial century have often been discussed. K. Heldmann's work of 1982 (above n. 48) offers the evidence most fully although I have expressed some disagreement with its analyses, *Gn.* 57 (1985); cf. Appendix 2.

⁵¹ For reasons that will become apparent below, Tacitus' Messala speaks of *obliuio moris antiqui* (*Dial.* 28.2) whereas *uitia* in general terms (*I.O.* 1.2.2) and likewise *corrupti mores* (1.2.4) are censured by Quintilian.

⁵² In this area the most significant likeness between Tacitus' Messala and Quintilian is discovered in the fault named last in the text, namely ignorance on the part of teachers. Thus Messala at *Dial.* 28.2 *inscientia praecipientium*, Maternus at 33.2 (a noticeable extension from 'teacher' to 'us') *nostrae desidiae et inscientiae aduersus acerrima ... studia*; Quint. *I.O.* 2.10.3 *ut inter praecipuas quas corrumpere eloquentiam causas licentia atque inscitia declamantium fuerit*, with my remarks, above p. 477, on likely provenance from the *De causis*. The likeness is not equally marked when it comes to *Dial.* 28.2 *desidia inuentutis* and *neglegentia parentum*. Contrast *I.O.* 1.2.5, 1.3. A teacher of Quintilian's stamp is unlikely to talk about his disciples and their parents in Messala's terms.

⁵³ Quintilian and Tacitus concur with Cicero himself in regarding the subjects they advise the orator to study, philosophy in particular, not as so many sciences, but as elements of a general civic culture. Thus Quint. *I.O.* 12 ch. 2, especially §§ 6–7 *hinc etiam illud est quod Cicero pluribus*

and law court.⁵⁴ Tacitus' Messala in turn projects (Quintilian's) Ciceronian ideal back to Cicero's period, and presents it as a general picture of republican oratory, in contrast with the oratory of his own age.

Nor are the likenesses restricted to the educational ideal itself. For the stages leading up to the ideal are equally common to both, although they could have been structured quite differently. Nothing could be more marked than the resemblance, in both authors, of the traditional nurture of the child in the family and the educational function of the mother, or an elderly relative, down to such exemplary figures as Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, to whom Quintilian, in a highly traditional view, adds Laelia and Hortensia, as Tacitus adds Aurelia and Atia. There is too a strong similarity in the objections to damaging influences of nurses and servants, to bad language and improper *mores*.⁵⁵ So much for nurture at home and the *prima discentium elementa*.⁵⁶

As for the next stage – that of the *grammaticus* – Barwick once more ought to be commended for clarifying the issue. Both Quintilian and Tacitus assign the basis of Ciceronian universality to the teaching of the *grammaticus*. Moreover both emphasize the shortcomings of contemporary instruction in that respect.⁵⁷ Or, to put the same proposition differently, both writers set their Ciceronian syllabus in a neo-Ciceronian context.⁵⁸ When these foundations have been laid, and then only, should the budding orator be apprenticed as it were to an outstanding master of the craft and thus learn to practise the art in the real settings, forensic and, as far as possible, deliberative.⁵⁹

et libris et epistulis testatur, dicendi facultatem ex intimis sapientiae fontibus fluere... quapropter haec exhortatio mea non eo pertinet ut esse oratorem philosophum uelim... (7)... atqui illum quem instituo Romanum quendam uelim esse sapientem, qui non secretis disputationibus sed rerum experimentis atque operibus uere ciuilem uirum exhibeat. Tac. *Dial.* 31.7 (Messala) *neque enim sapientem informamus neque Stoicorum comitem sed eum qui quasdam artes haurire, omnes libere decet.* Cicero, while assenting to the universal approach which necessitates 'sampling' of knowledge, offers a varied range of opinions in the *De or.*: contrast 1.21 (with A. D. Leeman's and H. Pinkster's comm. vol. 1 [1981], pp. 58–60), 1.218, 3.54, 76, al.

⁵⁴ For Cicero's encyclopaedic approach in Quintilian and Tacitus, see Appendix 4.

⁵⁵ Cornelia at Quint. *I.O.* 1.1.6, and in Messala's speech, Tac. *Dial.* 28.5; Laelia and Hortensia at Quint. *ibid.*, Aurelia and Atia at Tac. *ibid.* The juxtaposition of these chapters in Quintilian and Tacitus strikes me as one of the best features of A. Gudeman's introduction to his commentary, 2nd ed. (1914), pp. 93–6. In both these authors alike we find an articulate and markedly similar theory of nurture and early education. But, since Gudeman was not explicit on this point, it is worth noting that, unlike Tacitus, Quintilian enables us to divine the origin of the theory at issue. For, in spite of all his *color Romanus* (which is even more marked in Tacitus), the author, at *I.O.* 1.1.4, 3.14, cites a Greek discussion by the famous Stoic Chrysippus, most probably *Περὶ παιδων ἀγωγῆς*. Gudeman too traced parallels in ps.-Plutarch's essay identically titled, and noted Quintilian's reference to the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon.

⁵⁶ Thus Tac. *Dial.* 30.1. Cf. Quint. *I.O.* 1.1.35 *inter prima elementa*, 1.2.1 *exire de gremio*.

⁵⁷ cf. Appendix 4 for Barwick's comparison of Quint. *I.O.* 1 chs. 4–10 with Tac. *Dial.* chs. 30–2 as regards the teaching of *artes*, and Pfeiffer for a wider view of Hellenistic *grammaticae*.

⁵⁸ Quint. *I.O.* 1.4.5 (on literary teaching) *quo minus sunt ferendi... qui hanc artem... cauillantur, quae nisi oratoris futuri fundamenta fideliter iecit, quidquid superstruxerit corrueat*, al. Tac. *Dial.* 30.1 (*transeo prima discentium elementa, in quibus et ipsis parum laboratur*:) *nec in auctoribus cognoscendis nec in euoluenda antiquitate nec in notitia uel rerum uel hominum uel temporum satis operae insumitur*.

⁵⁹ Quint. *I.O.* 10.5.19 *quare iuuenis qui rationem inueniendi eloquendique a praeceptoribus diligenter acceperit..., exercitationem quoque modicam sibi fuerit consecutus, oratorem sibi aliquem, quod apud maiores fieri solebat, deligat, quem sequatur, quem imitetur*, etc. Tac. *Dial.* 34.1 *ergo apud maiores nostros iuuenis ille, qui foro et eloquentiae parabatur, imbutus iam domestica disciplina, refertus honestis studiis, deducebatur a patre uel a propinquis ad eum oratorem qui principem in ciuitate locum obtinebat, hunc sectari, hunc prosequi*, etc. An occasional touch of colour differs characteristically, but nevertheless it is clear that the same advice is given in either case.

Finally the fashionable exercise of declamation is criticized on virtually identical grounds by the two writers, although the rhetorician and the statesman would, understandably, see it from different points of view. Quintilian's partial objection, like the total objection of Tacitus' Messala, is the unreality of the training. This is summed up in the contrast between the *factae res* of the scholastic *controversiae* and forensic or deliberative *ueritas*.⁶⁰

The evidence so far surveyed cannot, in my view, be explained by the assumption that two contemporary authors writing about the same educational topics in oratory were bound to agree on some details.⁶¹ Certainly there are resemblances of detail, but there is also much more than mere detail. We are dealing with an articulate and well-defined educational theory – Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism in oratory – which Tacitus makes his Messala express, understandably, in the historical setting of the *Dialogus*, without mentioning Quintilian's name.

In conclusion it may be recalled that it was after all Quintilian who had, for the benefit of his own time, reformulated the ideal of the widely educated Ciceronian orator. Likewise it was Quintilian who had reminded his contemporaries of the Ciceronian subjects to be studied, and had marked out the level of study to be aimed at. All this had been achieved in opposition to contemporary tendencies, and it now reappears adapted by Tacitus to the purpose of Messala's speeches in this part of the *Dialogus*.

(2) Now for the reverse of the coin. For we are told by many that there are differences between Quintilian and Tacitus' Messala, not only likenesses. Where are differences to be found? I suggest that the solution of that problem has been prejudiced by a failure of perception. Scholars have not perceived that significant differences are found almost entirely outside the substance of the educational doctrine and rhetorical theory which we have discussed so far. Doctrine and theory are one aspect, but literary form and style, character drawing and social convention, are quite another. The former seems as much marked by similarities as the latter seems marked by differences.

Tacitus makes Messala draw attention to the fascinating social fact that he alone among the disputants speaks for the city of Rome to provincials born though now of considerable standing in the city.⁶² This fact becomes so explicit that it almost violates the high degree of social tact that obtains throughout. But it loses the sting it might otherwise have, because the comments are not about the virtues but the faults of the city: 28.3 *ego de urbe et his propriis ac uernaculis uitii loquar*, 29.3 *propria et pecuniaria huius urbis uitia*. Moreover Roman Messala is a member of a highly aristocratic family.⁶³ A traditional Roman figure, then, to put a traditional Roman view, and one who belonged to the young generation at the dramatic date of the dialogue.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Thus Quintilian frequently, but with especial vigour at *I.O.* 5.12.22, an extract (no. 3) from the *De causis*: *igitur et ille quem instituimus adulescens componat se ad imitationem ueritatis... iam in schola uictoriam spectet*, etc. Cf. above pp. 476–7, and Barwick (1954), 11–13. Thus too Tac. *Dial.* 31.1 *non ut in rhetorum scholis declamarent nec ut fictis nec ullo modo ad ueritatem accedentibus controuersiis... uocem exercerent* etc., cf. 35.4.

⁶¹ W. den Boer (above n. 47), p. 209, argues on these lines.

⁶² *Dial.* 28.2–3, *quae mala primum in urbe nata, mox per Italiam fusa, iam in provincias manant. quamquam uestra uobis notiora sunt*; (3) *ego de urbe et his propriis ac uernaculis uitii loquar, quae* etc.

⁶³ This, however, as H. Dessau, *PIR* 3¹, Messala 468, points out, does not necessarily make him a descendant of the renowned orator Messala Corvinus. Indeed one feels tempted to go a step further, and wonder whether the absence of any reference to this connexion is not likely to exclude such a guess. In a dialogue *de oratoribus* it would have been natural to say so, had it been the case.

⁶⁴ cf. Tac. *Hist.* 4.42.1.

The particular traditionalism with which Tacitus invested this young nobleman has often been observed, though rarely, I believe, with appropriate conclusions to follow.⁶⁵ It is indeed a remarkable fact that Tacitus' Messala, whilst appropriating what I have described above as Quintilian's educational Ciceronianism, yet never declares it an aim for contemporary teaching – for and against Quintilian in an almost balanced fashion. The modern age receives attention solely as a negative factor. Anything that qualifies for approval is set in historical retrospect – Ciceronianism seen as the oratory of the republican age.

Could it be conceived, therefore, that, Quintilian or not, Tacitus has merely taken some major notions from Cicero, and stitched them together, thus providing the content for Messala's speeches? As far as I am aware, such a radical solution has never been suggested in this form, not even by those who are embarrassed by what they regard as an ambiguity of evidence for and against Quintilian.⁶⁶ Wisely, I believe. For what earlier looked to us like a coherent account of oratorical (and not only oratorical) education, shared by Quintilian and Tacitus' Messala, is not explained by this radical answer.

Moreover Messala's Ciceronianism, though supposed to be set in Cicero's own time, scarcely accords with its supposed historical setting. It does however largely accord with Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism. Here a notable observation of Theodor Zielinski's should be recalled: Cicero, he suggested, owes his unique position at the head of that Roman literary tradition of which oratory is a large part, to Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism.⁶⁷ It may be suggested that the Messala portion of the *Dialogus* now under discussion canvasses precisely the pre-eminence reserved for Cicero in connexion with a theory of education for the orator. A surprising consequence of this new position of the orator will be noted below.⁶⁸ It may be added that the marked moralism of Tacitus' picture of republican oratory strongly contrasts with Cicero, but is close to Quintilian's moralism in rhetorical theory, although its own colouring must not be neglected.⁶⁹ In spite of all this, it needs hardly to be said, knowledge and use of Cicero's rhetorical writings are a remarkable feature of the *Dialogus*,⁷⁰ but do not exclude the links already demonstrated between Quintilian's educational doctrine and the speeches on the same topic by Tacitus' Messala. With this escape route barred, we are still confronted by the same apparent contradiction as before: a theory, in Quintilian, of oratorical education for present and practical use, with Cicero in the centre; and the same theory, in Tacitus, found inapplicable to the speaker's own time, reflected back to the Ciceronian age itself by the aristocratic Messala. The manner of presentation thus raises problems different and separable from the theory, and the evidence for it, that were discussed above.

It is a corollary of that position that Tacitus' manner of presentation must not be

⁶⁵ I refer especially to den Boer (above n. 47), pp. 209–10, Güngerich (above n. 29), p. 440, K. Bringmann loc. cit. (above n. 47).

⁶⁶ See preceding note.

⁶⁷ *Cicero im Wandel d. Jahrhunderte*³ (1912), p. 36. There is still much to be said about Cicero in the literature of the first imperial century. Valuable hints for such a discussion are found in vol. 28 of the *Entretiens* Fond. Hardt, 1982; *Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron*, especially in M. Winterbottom's contribution, 'Cicero and the Silver Age'.

⁶⁸ Below n. 71 and p. 494.

⁶⁹ The contrast between Cicero's less moralistic approach to oratory and Quintilian's moralism has been discussed by C. J. Classen, 'Ciceros *orator perfectus* ein *vir bonus dicendi peritus*?' in *Commemoratio, Studi... R. Ribuoli* (1986), 43–55.

⁷⁰ Perhaps the clearest, though not the only, indication of Tacitus' independence is the reference to the text of Cic. *Or.* 12, at *Dial.* 32.6 in contrast with Quint. *I.O.* 12.2.23, on which see Güngerich's acute discussion, *CP* 46 (1951), 163–4.

ignored. He obviously aimed at colouring (Quintilian's) neo-Ciceronian doctrine, and makes Messala put it forward. This is so in two respects. First and foremost there is the reluctance to make Messala into a *scholasticus*. He must not look professional, let alone professorial, like Quintilian; and that is the more important because of the strongly marked scholarly features of his speeches. Certainly avoidance by Vipstanus Messala of a teacher's role is social *ethopoeia*. But there is more to it than that.

What Messala tells his friends could be a recipe for contemporary teaching. Yet he puts forward no such thing. The tenor of his argument allows of no recipe for any teaching now. At the outset (*Dial.* 28.1–3) all those concerned – parents, pupils, teachers – are faulted; and that leaves as it were no agents for the educational process. After this initial rejection his attitude throughout is polarized between total condemnation of the present day, and total admiration of the Ciceronian age. Thus the two periods are made to exclude each other. By the same token, therefore, there can hardly have been an appeal for neo-Ciceronian betterment, *more Quintiliano*, in the peroration of Messala's speech which is lost in the lacuna at chs. 35–6.

Messala's contribution is offered by him, not as a syllabus for teaching in the present age (which is seen to be unable to accept it), but as a reason, *causa*, why the oratory of the day is in the parlous state diagnosed by the author of the *Dialogus* and agreed by all the disputants, with the possible but not certain exception of the modernist, Aper. This purpose strictly excludes all references to the conditions of contemporary teaching – except condemnatory. It does not, however, exclude attention to educational conditions believed to be healthier; and such, the speaker says, are the conditions of the later republic, the age, that is, of Cicero. Now we have already seen that Messala's educational doctrine appears in fact to be Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism, and it is this doctrine, as also noted before, which is transposed back not only to Cicero's own career but is described, quite generally, as the procedure of the late republic. That approach may seem just, but cannot be justified entirely without forcing the historical picture, as again Barwick was the only scholar to point out.⁷¹

It is true, of course, Quintilian entertained very great hopes that his teaching on the basis of neo-Ciceronian doctrine had overcome modern decline, whereas Tacitus' Messala obviously had no such hopes. Hence it is occasionally doubted that Tacitus would avail himself of Quintilian's doctrine in setting up Messala's argument.⁷² But

⁷¹ Barwick (1929) (above n. 41), 85, rightly says of the (neo-) Ciceronian *Bildungsideal* that Messala represents it 'unter Umbiegung der tatsächlichen Verhältnisse, als das in alter Zeit allgemein gültige', referring to *Dial.* 30.4, 31.1. Talking about the various aspects of Cicero's eloquence, Tacitus shows himself by no means unaware of the differences between his oratory and the oratory of his time. For he makes Aper say at 22.1 *ad Ciceronem uenio, cui eadem pugna cum aequalibus fuit quae mihi uobiscum est. illi enim antiquos mirabantur, ipse suorum temporum eloquentiam anteponebat. nec ulla re magis eiusdem aetatis oratorum praecurrit quam iudicio* etc. This of course differs from *Bildungsideal*, but any rhetorical work of Cicero's, and particularly the *De oratore*, illustrates a similar point. For the relation of Ciceronianism proper and Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism, see above p. 489.

⁷² So especially den Boer (above n. 47), p. 210, but also others. I argue above that optimism and pessimism so called are notions too crude to impinge on Quintilian's argument which is partly optimistic and partly pessimistic. Even less do they impinge on Tacitus' firm and perceptive modes of thinking. They do not affect Barwick's reasoning (1954) (above n. 46), pp. 17–18, who considered Tac. *Dialogus* as a whole directed precisely against Quintilian's 'optimism' in *De causis* and *Institutio* alike, but also, within the *Dialogus* itself, against the optimism of 'Messala-Quintilian'. My own argument above is even less affected by them, as it does not operate with the notion 'Messala-Quintilian'. Heldmann (1980) (above n. 48), and also 1982 *passim*, suggested that the doctrinaire classicism of Messala in the *Dialogus* excluded

how, it may be asked, do optimism or pessimism about the applications of that doctrine affect its deployment in discussion? The doctrine surely belongs to a different order of thought from its possible application, whether optimistic or pessimistic. After all Quintilian's educational theory (applied to his own time) and Messala's (transposed back to the late republic) concur in a (neo-)Ciceronian core. It is that core, common to both, that matters for a decision on Tacitus' (critical) dependence on Quintilian.⁷³

The reverse of the Quintilianic coin, then, is far from invalidating Barwick's basic contention. At *Dial.* chs. 28–32 and 33–5 Tacitus' Messala does restate Quintilian's neo-Ciceronian doctrine, but uses it as an aetiology which purports to explain the decline of oratory, not excluding the generation taught by Quintilian. His presentation has to be distinguished from the theory he offers. With apparent good reason – since it is Cicero who is used as a model – , he transfers the neo-Ciceronian theory of education to late-republican practice. He draws a largely idealized picture of republican teaching and practice. Thus by an adroit use of Quintilian's educational theories, Tacitus' Messala rejects by implication the basic teaching of the same contemporary master. He rejects it, not because of an explicit opposition to Cicero, whom he praises as much as Quintilian did, but because of a simple contention: all contemporaries involved in the preparatory process for oratory – parents, pupils, and teachers alike – show themselves unable to give reality to these Ciceronian ideals of the late republic. That, I suggest, is the way adopted by Tacitus to place the Messala speeches firmly in the framework of his wider argument. On the surface he expresses approval of (neo-)Ciceronianism. Below the surface, subtly and indirectly, its rejection is being prepared.

(3) So far my argument has been that certain features of Tacitus' presentation should not be allowed to block the vista to Quintilian's doctrine in Messala's speeches at *Dial.* chs. 28ff. Having shored up Barwick's already strong case for Quintilian, I now propose for consideration its provenance, or partial provenance, from the *De causis corruptae eloquentiae*.

(a) The keyword, *causae*, receives emphasis in Messala's two speeches (*Dial.* 28.1, 32.5 and 7) or in remarks relating to them (Messala 15.2, Maternus 24.3, 27.1) – all passages directing attention back to the major subject of the work, posed in the author's preamble: why, *cur*, is it that the oratory of the present age has declined? (1.1 and 3). No one except Messala, in these two speeches, gives a strict answer to this question. The answer is summarized in one of the passages just noted: 32.5 *ergo hanc primam et praecipuam causam arbitror* <*cur*> (Puteolanus, *arbitror* C, *arbitratur* ζ BQ ψ) *in tantum ab eloquentia antiquorum oratorum recesserimus*, etc. (7) *sunt aliae causae, magnae et graues, quas a uobis aperiri aequum est, quoniam quidem ego iam meum munus expleui*, etc.

almost by definition the use of Quintilian's reforming classicism. I doubt nevertheless that the similarity of Quintilian's and Messala's educational doctrines can be set aside, whatever the application, optimistic or pessimistic, reforming or restrictive; cf. above n. 48.

⁷³ This difference between doctrines and their presentation applies to various controversies in Tacitean scholarship, including Güngerich's attempt, in *Gn.* (1955) (above nn. 29 and 47), 440–1, to remove the Messala section of the *Dialogus* from the proximity of Quintilian by stressing certain secondary, though not unimportant, differences. Such are the functions variously attributed to philosophy by these two writers on oratory. Again Messala advises the orator to make occasional use of Epicurus and the Epicureans (*Dial.* 31.6, Güngerich *ibid.*), another difference of that order, for the advice would have been unacceptable to Quintilian or Cicero. But neither disagreement would have rendered Quintilian's remarks on philosophy and rhetoric unusable for Tacitus' own purposes.

An appropriate way of restating this evidence is as follows. The only specific answer to the initial problem happens to be Messala's, for Maternus, as has been stated occasionally, only appears to give such an answer towards the end of the work. Messala's answer, although the only specific answer, is not represented as the only possible answer. Moreover the most clearly aetiological terminology and, by the same token, the closest proximity to the first part of Quintilian's title *De causis (corruptae eloquentiae)* is found in Messala's speeches, which contain substance demonstrably Quintilian's. This observation does not, and need not, apply to the second part of Quintilian's title.⁷⁴ On the other hand we have already stressed that the aetiological subject differs from that of the *Institutio*, although the latter has occasional references to the former, always tangential to the main theme, whereas aetiology is central to the *De causis* and the *Dialogus* alike.

(b) The third item in the list of extracts from the *De causis* appended to this paper indicts the schools of rhetoric for their fancifulness and their insufficient attention to the realities of forum and council. This again is a central feature that links the Messala speeches (*Dial.* ch. 35, cf. 30.1–2) with the *De causis*, whereas its occurrence in the *Institutio* is tangential.

(c) An important feature of Messala's indictment of modern oratory is the decline from a great cultural past in which Cicero had set up the ideal of a widely based education. It is well known that Quintilian demonstrated in the *Institutio* how this decline could be reversed by attention to Ciceronian learning and culture, and we have seen above that the ideal of Ciceronianism links Quintilian and Tacitus' Messala, although they applied it in different ways. Now Ciceronian learning and culture do not appear among the attested extracts from the *De causis*. It has however been shown in an earlier part of this paper (above p. 477 on *Inst.* 2.10.1) that Quintilian's complaint about the *licentia* and *inscitia* in the schools of rhetoric (a neglect, that is, of the learning and culture which Quintilian found in Cicero) is one of the most probable among the group of unattributed borrowings from the *De causis* – borrowings rendered highly probable by terminology and context. Although it cannot be asserted with the same confidence as (a) and (b), I suggest nevertheless that this passage is a likely source of the corresponding parts of the Messala speeches in the *Dialogus*.⁷⁵

From this brief survey we may infer that, in this context, too, the evidence concerning *De causis* is more substantial than is now normally accepted by writers on Quintilian and Tacitus. Three major motifs of the work are paralleled by the Messala speeches of the *Dialogus*: (1) the aetiological approach, in contrast with the *Institutio*; (2) the complaint that the modern schools of rhetoric pay insufficient attention to

⁷⁴ The distinction between the subject of Quintilian's first work – *corrupta eloquentia*, decadent eloquence – and that of Tacitus' *Dialogus* – the decline of oratory – has been noted recently, as though it had not in fact been seen as early as Reuter (above n. 38), p. 57. Reuter did not allow that distinction to interfere with establishing a close connexion between these two aetiological works (as I have called them above) and I see no reason why that should be otherwise. Several scholars, however, have recently demurred for that reason; thus e.g. Kennedy (above n. 1), p. 23 and in general p. 138, and, within a larger argument on *Gattungsgeschichte*, Heldmann (1980), pp. 8, 20, also (1982) (both above n. 48).

⁷⁵ For illustration we could cite much in Messala's speeches from *Dial.* 28 onwards. See especially 28.2 *desidia iuuentutis ... et inscientia praecipientium*, 30.1 *nec ... satis operae insumitur*, 30.2 *sed expetuntur quos rhetoras uocant* etc. *referam necesse est animus ad eam disciplinam qua usus esse eos oratores accepimus quorum infinitus labor et cotidiana meditatio et in omni genere studiorum adsiduas exercitationes ipsorum continentur libris*, 30.3 ref. to Cic. *Brutus*, 31, 32.1 *ipsa multarum artium scientia* etc., 32.3 ignorance of contemporary *deserti*, 32.5–6, 35.

what rhetoric is about in practice, the realities of lawcourt and council; and (3) the complaint that the modern schools pay insufficient attention to learning and culture – with the corollary, elsewhere in Quintilian as well as in the Messala speeches, that Ciceronian learning and culture are essential for the orator. Of these major points, (1) and (2) are explicitly attested for the *De causis*; (3) may be conjecturally assigned to it with great probability.

On the other hand we note without surprise that an obvious concern attested for the *De causis* – the stylistic and formal features of *corrupta eloquentia*⁷⁶ and probably Seneca's above all – is not equally represented by Messala. This need not cause surprise because presumably, by the time when Tacitus started writing, much of the Senecan craze had passed. Ciceronian seriousness, variety, and balance (though not prolixity) could be represented as a model again, and archaism was not far away.⁷⁷ In spite of the Ciceronian tinge of the *Dialogus*, however, Tacitus' other works suggest that their author was not blind to the limitations of stylistic neo-Ciceronianism.

(4) Searching for *terra firma* in a notoriously undercharted, if overdisputed, area, I place last what too many have placed first – the bearing of Tacitus' wider historical and literary purposes on an assessment of the Messala speeches from *Dial.* ch. 28 onwards. *Terra firma* there is, but some of its contours have been drawn out of focus by the discoverer, K. Barwick. Many, though not all, students of Quintilian and Tacitus have assented to the most important part of his findings of 1929:⁷⁸ the educational theory and the Ciceronianism of Messala's speeches are in their substance derived from Quintilian; fewer have assented to his suggestion of 1954⁷⁹ that they are primarily based on the *De causis*. Yet there the confusing simplification of Barwick's label, Messala–Quintilian, has caused trouble, and to that extent the complaints of Barwick's readers have not been unjustified, though hardly ever appropriately defined. If, as will be desirable, Tacitus' presentation is dissociated from his materials, further questions need to be answered. What are the functions of this curious dissociation? Why did Tacitus present Quintilian's doctrine in a patently non-Quintilianic manner?

About the facts of Tacitus' non-Quintilianic presentation there can be little doubt. The facts have indeed been often stated, but have brought about muddle rather than clarification.⁸⁰ Quintilian made it quite clear that contemporary oratory had declined, and further that neo-Ciceronianism was his recipe for healing the malaise. Tacitus' Messala was as clear as was Quintilian about the contemporary malaise, yet was never allowed any reference to these contemporary attempts. He was a condemnatory judge of present conditions, putting forward not only, like Quintilian, an aetiology of decline, but one of irretrievable decline.⁸¹

⁷⁶ The possibility of some critical reflections by Messala on diction and style, near the beginning of the lacuna in ch. 35, cannot be wholly excluded; see 35.5 *ingentibus uerbis* – a context that recalls, as Dr M. Winterbottom reminds me, the well-known criticism of declamation, not excluding style, at Petron. 1. Yet I doubt if that will have amounted to much since the text before the lacuna ends *cum ad ueros iudices uentum*, and thus moves away from the topic of style. For these words involve the antithesis to the scholastic situation of the declaimers much noticed by various authors, not least by Quintilian himself, e.g. *I.O.* 5.13.42ff., especially 45 *in scholis permittendum semper, in foro rarum*, *ibid.* *ubi uera res agitur*, et al. Cf. *De causis*, Extract 3 (from *I.O.* 5.12.22–3).

⁷⁷ M. Winterbottom, 'Quintilian and Rhetoric', in *Empire and Aftermath, Silver Latin II* ed. T. A. Dorey (1975), pp. 79–97, moved by some impressive examples of non-Ciceronian ethos in Quintilian's style, seems to be inclined largely to discount the notion of neo-Ciceronianism in first-century prose. ⁷⁸ Above n. 46. ⁷⁹ Above n. 46. ⁸⁰ See above nn. 47–8.

⁸¹ These points caused Kennedy and, more recently, Heldmann (above n. 48) to dissociate not only Messala's presentation but also the contents of his speech from Quintilian.

This result is obtained in two steps as it were. The initial position accommodates a critique of the ordinary teaching of the day, which is as marked as Quintilian's, but does not raise the topic of modern improvements. In his definition of *causa* or *causae*, Messala agrees with Quintilian, though, within the constraints of the dramatic dialogue setting, not identifying his authority's, or any authority's, name. Indeed no authority seems to be needed. Messala says that the *causae* are not recondite or unknown to anyone; he is expressing simply *quae omnes sentimus* (28.1) – a somewhat backhanded compliment to Quintilian, if this is what it is. General consent of the disputants (including even the modernist, M. Aper) is claimed for the Quintilianic though traditional *causae*.

As for the second step in the argument, we have already shown that the Ciceronianism of Tacitus' Messala must be identified as Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism transferred back to the Ciceronian age, where it originated. If we now attempt to look at it from the author's angle, we cannot help noticing a slight, but not insignificant, shift of meaning in the term 'Ciceronian age'. For Barwick, as was observed earlier, seems to have been alone in noticing that Messala is made to describe as conditions of the late republic what were in fact procedures on which Cicero disagreed with his contemporaries – or, to put it differently, what were in fact his own contributions.⁸² That shift of meaning must have resulted from Tacitus' ingenious expedient of shifting the historical context from neo-Ciceronianism back to the Ciceronian age.

The consequence of that expedient has not been as much discussed as it should have been. It can be represented, as Heldmann has done, as excluding the major use of Quintilianic material. But to do so results in neglecting the evidence which is Quintilianic. Or else we leave that evidence *in situ*, and accept the consequence. Tacitus' expedient serves to demote from its prominent place the Quintilianic compromise between Ciceronianism as a vehicle of teaching and Ciceronianism as a vehicle of criticism. The rhetorician's doctrine is trenchantly qualified by the economy of the Tacitean work into which the author fits it. Quintilian's Ciceronian doctrine is transposed back to the late-republican age, and thereby Tacitus' Messala refuses as it were to be drawn into contemporary debates beyond the narrow question of decline. Thus, if the reader takes the author's presentation as seriously as the strenuous economy of the *Dialogus* suggests it should be taken, he can learn how vitally Tacitus' presentation modifies his rhetorical material. This perception opens up the wider topic of the other disputants, and the layout of their debate. The Messala speeches with their combination of Quintilianism and anti-Quintilianism are but part of that larger debate.

IX. M. APER AND CURIATIUS MATERNUS

After many direct questions on Quintilian's doctrine as presented by himself and by Tacitus, it may now be apposite to ask some indirect questions, particularly what new light falls on the other disputants in the *Dialogus*, if, that is, the above findings on Messala are justified. In view of the length of the preceding discussion, a brief glance only at the other *personae* is here possible.

⁸² An equivocation of Ciceronian and late republican was detected by Barwick (1929), p. 85; cf. above n. 71. Tacitus, however, was quite aware of that; the emphasis with which M. Aper at *Dial.* 22.1 dissociates Cicero from his contemporaries has also been remarked at n. 71: *ad Ciceronem uenio, cui eadem pugna cum aequalibus suis fuit quae mihi uobiscum est* etc. The disputants hold fascinatingly diverse views of historical periods.

In this survey I omit Julius Secundus, one of the two admired teachers of the author – 2.1 *celeberrima tum ingenia fori nostri* etc. –, who is drawn in faint outline, and given a function in the mechanics but not the substance of the debate. I put it this way because I am inclined to regard the earlier attempts to provide him with a set speech in the lacuna between chs. 35 and 36 by now as a dead duck.⁸³

M. Aper, the author's other teacher, comes as a complete contrast. In his case Tacitus' *ethopoeia* stands out, and the contours are striking, but will not now be noticed, except for one or two features clearly related to the aspects of the author's critical purpose here under discussion. Aper's part in providing the substance of the dialogue is large. No reader can miss his function – to represent the standing of a live and effective type of recent oratory or, in rhetorical terms, to defend the claims of a kind of modernism which negates the classical standing of the ancients and, by implication, the subject of the dialogue which presumes that standing. This function he is made to carry out with conviction and panache, although undercut, in the scheme of the dialogue, by Maternus' courteous rejoinder – not contradicted by Aper – that he does not really accept the superiority of the moderns; he has taken only *contra dicendi partes* (24.2).⁸⁴

Two matters call for comment if the semi-Quintilianic aspect of the Messala speeches, and, even more, Quintilian's own views on the contemporary scene, are to be made explicit. One is Aper's conviction that modern oratory must not only be defended but is actually superior to that of the supposedly great past. If this were pressed, Quintilian's *corrupta eloquentia* as much as his neo-Ciceronianism would be nullified, and the historical Ciceronianism of Tacitus' Messala would appear as merely archaic. There could be no true argument on the *causae* of decadent eloquence (as in Quintilian) or of oratorical decline (the apparent subject of the *Dialogus*), because there would be no decline to account for.

The other matter that calls for comment is equally important. That is the benefit which, Aper maintains, modern oratory confers on princeps and state alike. Clearly Quintilian and Tacitus' Aper, in their diverse ways,⁸⁵ saw well enough the realities of oratory as far as princeps, senate, and lawcourt were concerned.

Here, however, some cross-currents enter. They carry Tacitean criticism of this fascinating and powerful figure. The message, as it were, that Tacitus here found

⁸³ The bibliography is too large to be recorded here, nor do I intend to go into the difficulties remaining in the layout of the set speeches and in the MSS. evidence. A good statement on some of the strong arguments against a set speech by Secundus on grounds of composition is made by U. Hass von Reitzenstein (1970) (Diss. Cologne), pp. 106–11 citing earlier literature. For the MSS. evidence see now C. E. Murgia, 'The Length of the Lacuna in Tac. *Dial.*', *Cal. St. in Cl. ant.* 12 (1981), 221–40, R. Häussler, *Philol.* 153 (1986), 69ff, especially pp. 73–7. They agree that the lacuna must be small, but are at variance about the remaining aspects of the problem.

⁸⁴ For speculations on the author's motive, see Hass von Reitzenstein (preceding n.), pp. 142–3, and, with a different approach, W. Deuse, 'Zur *advocatus-diaboli* Funktion Apers im *Dialogus* und zur Methode ihrer Deutung', *Grazer Beiträge* 3 (1975), 51–68.

⁸⁵ Diverse certainly their ways were. Yet it was the same imperial protector (Vespasian) of the idealistic rhetorician Quintilian, and of the young orator Tacitus, whom the Tacitean Aper extols (at 8.3) as *uenerabilis senex et patientissimus ueri* relying on the arts of Eprius and Vibius. The realistic and amoral Aper is the only disputant in the *Dialogus* who defends a full modern role for oratory. He allows that neither Eprius nor Vibius was *moribus egregius*, and yet lauds them as follows: *per multos iam annos potentissimi sunt ciuitatis ac, donec libuit, principes fori, nunc principes in Caesaris amicitia agunt feruntque cuncta atque ab ipso principe cum quadam reuerentia diliguntur*, etc. Tacitus' outspokenness concerning modern oratory seems to put a large question-mark against the brief aside of G. Kennedy (above n. 1), p. 138, that the *Dialogus* 'does not touch upon the most idealistic aspects of Quintilian's orator as an advisor to states and emperors'.

appropriate for Aper to convey is modernism, a realism pretty close to something amoral and anticultural; it has already been seen that Messala's moral traditionalism and Ciceronianism, like Quintilian's, are wholly opposed to it.

There is a largely political cross-current as well. It is brought in by the incidence of delation at a time when emperors had a stake in the outcome of prosecutions. The phenomenon is written large in Aper's speech (5.3–10). As is well known, his exemplars for modern oratory – *libentius enim nouis et recentibus quam remotis et obliteratis exemplis utor* (8.1) – were Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus, prominent among the powerful and terrifying *delatores* from the time of Nero onwards.⁸⁶ In the *Histories* Tacitus' censure is unequivocal.⁸⁷ Even in the *Dialogus*, where a high degree of social tact and courtesy moderates personal criticism, general, if not personal, criticism is unmistakable.⁸⁸ There can be no doubt therefore that however great the author's admiration for Aper (and Secundus) may have been in his youth (*iuuenilis ardor*, 2.1), the manner of his reporting it accords with these characterizing critical touches – *ethopoeia*.

Tacitus then has so depicted Aper as to give credibility to an extreme of contemporary oratory both in aim and rhetorical idea. The symbolical force of this figure, part portrait and part doubtless caricature, is strong. As Michael Winterbottom has said, 'Aper stands for all the orators of his type that the century produced.'⁸⁹ Against him he set another extreme – not the compromising Quintilian, but an aristocratic traditionalist, Vipstanus Messala, who has learned from Quintilian, but has taken his neo-Ciceronianism to a logical conclusion that would be unacceptable to the master. This cuts the link with the present age and reduces neo-Ciceronianism to historical Ciceronianism. All Messala is prepared to say about the present age is to castigate it for its inability to accept traditional education but also Ciceronian oratory and culture. Tacitus appears to have chosen these two extremes as characteristic of the time. He leaves no room for the Quintilianic compromise itself.

As for Curiatius Maternus, the historical master-key entrusted to him by Tacitus has, understandably, attracted so much modern scholarly comment that I can restrict myself to two observations suggested by the Quintilianic evidence discussed in this paper. One is the light cast by Maternus' critique upon Messala's semi-Quintilianic discourse; the other is the question how Quintilian's full compromise in *De causis* (and in the *Institutio* built on the earlier work) stands up to the radical critique of the Tacitean Maternus.

For by Maternus' criteria the Ciceronianism of Messala – derived from Quintilian but set in the late republic, not in his own time – appears to be possible only in the

⁸⁶ Eprius, *Dial.* 5.7, 8.1 (cf. *RE* 6, 261–4, *PIR* 3², 82–4); Vibius, *Dial.* 8.1 (cf. *RE* 8 A2, 1968–70, *PIR* 3², 420–1; A. B. Bosworth, *Ath.* 51 (1973), 72–4.

⁸⁷ As regards Marcellus Eprius, the tone of *Hist.* 4.42–3 amounts to stern censure; such touches as 43.2 *Marcellus minacibus oculis* cannot escape notice, and are not meant to do so. One can only regret that the Tacitean summary in the *Histories* of Eprius' career is lost together with the reign of Titus and Eprius' demise. As regards Vibius, the celebrated epigram, *Hist.* 2, 10.1, leaves no doubt: *pecunia potentia ingenio inter claros magis quam inter bonos*, cf. para. 4 in the same chapter.

⁸⁸ The kind of amoral oratory implied in Aper's praises of Eprius and Vibius remains by no means unchallenged in the *Dialogus*. Maternus makes no secret of harsh general disapproval: 12.2 *nam lucrosae huius et sanguinantiae eloquentiae usus recens et ex malis moribus natus atque, ut tu dicebas, Aper, in locum teli repertus*. But Tacitus allows him even personal censure of Aper's admired *delatores*: 13.4 *nam Crispus iste et Marcellus, ad quorum exempla me uocas, quid habent in hac sua fortuna concupiscendum? quod timent, an quod timentur?* etc.

⁸⁹ M. Winterbottom (1964) (above n. 16), p. 94.

conditions of a politically distracted *res publica*. Hence it must be rejected on political grounds. *A fortiori* that verdict would rule out Quintilian's own neo-Ciceronianism, as many contemporary readers will have been aware. The rhetorician's supposedly renewed Ciceronian principles could not be grafted to the existing body politic; it would not 'take'; the tissue would reject it. Maternus' dialectic of 'disturbed republic – great oratory' versus 'peaceful monarchy – reduced oratory' acts like a power-tool that uproots Messala's historical Ciceronianism, just as it would uproot Quintilian's own neo-Ciceronianism from which it was taken. Ironically therefore Aper's denial, earlier in the dialogue, of a need for an aetiology, a *de causis*, now returns. Aper denied the need because he refused to admit that there was a decline to account for. Maternus too denies decline, or admits it only in a manner of speaking (*Dial.* 41). Hence again no aetiology is called for; the subject of the dialogue is invalidated: the orators of the day are as competent as they can be – in the conditions of the day, which have their own advantage. It would follow, though it is not said, that the well-known *De causis* of Quintilian, and his massive *Institutio* to boot, would be even less valid because they fail twice-over – as Ciceronianism and as neo-Ciceronianism.

It is hard to overlook, therefore, that Quintilian, the most renowned rhetorician of the age immediately preceding – the age, that is, which the *Dialogus* commemorates – though in accordance with convention never named, is yet never far away from the argument. Directly or indirectly, and in differing ways, the three major disputants all turn the debate against Quintilian.

Messala is the only disputant to do so directly. By reflecting Quintilian's neo-Ciceronianism back to the republic and by denying a degenerate modern age the ability to use it, he halves as it were what was a whole in Quintilian. Thus the argument that Tacitus has given him seeks to deprive the age of the master's neo-classical oratory. If Quintilian had been able to witness the debate, he might well have exclaimed: Gods, preserve me from my friends! Aper attacks indirectly, representing in strong colours what Quintilian worked so hard against. Maternus too does so indirectly. He disposes of all pretensions to great modern oratory by depriving Messala of his historical Ciceronianism (or semi-Quintilianism), and destroying on political grounds the approved republican basis of Cicero's oratory. If Aper undercut a search *de causis* on behalf of modern eloquence, because modern eloquence had not declined, Maternus undercut it, because classical oratory was politically unacceptable.

X. THE SEQUENCE OF SPEECHES IN THE *DIALOGUS* AND TACITUS' OPINIONS

A few remarks on the main stages of argument will not come amiss, now that my last section has linked them with the Quintilianic problem. Rejecting a speech by Secundus,⁹⁰ Barwick was able to clear away some thickets that occluded a view of the layout of the speeches. He perceived their pairing, and suggested convincingly that there were three such pairs: (1) Aper–Maternus, (2) Aper–Messala, (3) Messala–Maternus.⁹¹ Seeing that the semi-Quintilianic aetiology is placed in the Messala speeches – again Barwick's suggestion, as was pointed out above –, it is now perhaps possible to infer a little more about the relation of these major stages of the debate to each other.

⁹⁰ Above nn. 41, 83.

⁹¹ (1) *Dial.* 5.3–10.8, 11.1–13.6; (2) 16.4–23.6, 25.1–26.8; (3) 28.1–32.7 and 33.4–35.5 (plus part of lacuna), 36.1 (lacuna)–41.5.

Messala's argument on *causae* serves as the centrepiece of the work. The patent rationale of the placing is to move the argument to the aetiology announced at the beginning and represented as (semi-Quintilianic) Ciceronianism, though the need for it was initially put in doubt by Aper, and later weighed by Maternus and found wanting. Messala is represented as achieving his aim by defending classical, republican, really Ciceronian, oratory and education against Aper's modernity, and, next, by his attempt to bar the way from historical Ciceronianism to a modern application of it such as Quintilian's, though this remains undefined.

Two corollaries may be noted. One is a serious fault in Barwick's nomenclature, which has proved a stumbling-block to many but, as already remarked above, has never been adequately faced. Barwick's nomenclature, 'Messala-Quintilian', does not follow from his argument. To justify this label, Barwick has to set aside the unequivocal rejection of neo-Ciceronianism by Tacitus' Messala. If we follow Tacitus' hints, we need to recognize, as I have sought to demonstrate above, that, in this central portion of the work, and at the very moment when Messala's (Quintilian's) Ciceronianism is unfolded, the great but unnamed rhetorician's consequential argument is destroyed. By restricting Messala's Ciceronianism, and equating it surprisingly with the republican period as a whole, Tacitus negates Quintilian's famous conclusion, his renewed Ciceronianism, which was to redress the discontents in the oratory of the time. Messala is represented no less as anti-Quintilian than as pro-Quintilian. It was highly meritorious that Barwick was able to trace the substance of Messala's education theory to its source. But it was unfortunate that he disregarded Tacitus' compositional touches. Let us no longer, therefore, talk of 'Messala-Quintilian' and let us acknowledge that Tacitus' compositional tenor in Messala's central speeches restricts Ciceronianism to the 'Ciceronian period', which, as Barwick himself saw, was rhetorically exaggerated by Messala when he identified it with 'the ancients' or 'Cicero's own age'.

Having lost the comfortable, but erroneous and muddling, label 'Messala-Quintilian', how do we fare with Barwick's consequential term, 'Maternus-Tacitus'?⁹² That term, too, I suggest, is a somewhat crude exaggeration, which we had better abandon. Few will doubt that Tacitus handed an historical master-key to Maternus which accorded a considerable measure of preference to the ex-orator and poet. But, however considerable, it need not, indeed must not, be taken to imply more than a measure of preference. Maternus' master-key does not unlock all the closed doors of the *Dialogus*.⁹³

No recourse to Tacitus' own style in the large historical works, or to his psychology,⁹⁴ is perhaps required to avoid the conclusion that Aper's modernist argument or Messala's classical-republican argument is wholly invalidated by its

⁹² Barwick (1954) (above n. 41), p. 17 'In dem Gegensatz Messala-Quintilian auf der einen und Maternus-Tacitus auf der anderen Seite fassen wir eins der Hauptmotive, die Tacitus zur Abfassung seines Dialogs veranlasst haben.' 'Maternus-Tacitus' again p. 18, and implied in the rest of the paper.

⁹³ A perceptive remark by R. Häussler may be compared with this notion. The remark appeared in 'De causis corruptae eloquentiae. Variationen eines röm. Themas', *Actes de la XII^e Conférence internat. d'études classiques*. Eirene (1972), Hakkert (Amsterdam, 1975), p. 314: 'Die taciteische Originalität liegt also nicht nur in der maternischen Erkenntnis, sondern in der Form des Ganzen.'

⁹⁴ Wilamowitz (1900), *Kl. Schr.* iii.246, Wilamowitz (1932), repr. 1955, ii.538 (above n. 39), denied that Tacitus, if judged by his own style in the large historical works, could have regarded the modern oratory for which Aper makes a case as *corrupta eloquentia*. Aper represents an aspect of Tacitus' personality according to Keyssner (above n. 46), 113, Syme, *Tacitus* i.109, Maternus another, conflicting, aspect, as again Keyssner argued.

sequel. Nor has the author to be represented as turning, in the course of that argument, from Flavian partisan into republican, and finally into monarchist. The progress of the speeches was scarcely seen by Tacitus as a single ascending line of truth-finding.⁹⁵

The *Dialogus* offers literary argument as well as literary artistry, but above all a piece of history that catches a great cultural phenomenon at different stages of evolution, each deeply embedded in politics – modernist oratory under the Flavian regime, classical Ciceronian oratory in the late republic, and ‘quiet oratory’ under post-Flavian monarchy.

There are, however, several lines of progression, and what I have already argued above suggests that one of these lines is what might be called the anonymous Quintilian motif. The speech pairs begin with a strong manifestation of modern oratory as it was about the time of the dramatic date of the dialogue. This part contained much in contemporary rhetoric which Quintilian has objected to in his own books, and Tacitus, to judge by what we read in his works, would have accepted many objections. In the second pair Quintilian’s neo-Ciceronianism comes into sight, but is at once shorn of its contemporary relevance in the manner described earlier. Finally Maternus puts in question the Ciceronian layer itself, and to that extent Quintilian’s Ciceronianism – already weakened by Messala’s restrictions – is destroyed. This is one motif convincingly (it might be thought) presented. But we have already learned that there are other motifs. How they are brought into balance and made into a unity – if they are so made – is another question.

XI. EXTRACTS FROM QUINTILIAN, *DE CAUSIS CORRUPTAE ELOQUENTIAE* OR *ALIUS LIBER* OR *ALIUD OPUS*

(1) *I.O.* 6.pr.3 nam ita forte accidit ut eum quoque librum quem *DE CAUSIS CORRUPTAE ELOQUENTIAE* emisi iam scribere aggressus ictu simili ferirer (*i.e.* filii morte).

(2) *I.O.* 2.4.41–2 his fere ueteres facultatem dicendi exercuerunt, assumpta tamen a dialecticis argumentandi ratione. nam fictas ad imitationem fori consiliorumque materias apud Graecos dicere circa Demetrium Phalerea institutum fere constat (constabat *A*). 42 an ab ipso id genus exercitationis sit inuentum, ut *ALIO* quoque *LIBRO* sum confessus, parum comperi. sed ne ii quidem qui hoc fortissime affirmant ullo satis idoneo auctore nituntur. Latinos uero dicendi praeceptores extremis *L. Crassi* temporibus coepisse Cicero auctor est (cf. *De or.* 3.93–5, *Suet. De rhet.* 2); quorum insignis maxime Plotius fuit.

(3) *I.O.* 5.12.17–23 ipsas autem argumentorum uelut sedes non me quidem omnes ostendisse confido, plurimas tamen.

quod eo diligentius faciendum fuit quia declamationes, quibus ad pugnam forensem uelut praepilatis exerceri solebamus, olim iam ab illa uera imagine orandi recesserunt, atque ad solam compositae uoluptatem neruis carent, non alio medius fidius uitio dicentium quam quo mancipiorum negotiatores formae puerorum uirilitate excisa lenocinantur. 18 nam ut illi robur ac lacertos barbamque ante omnia et alia quae natura proprie maribus dedit parum existimant decora, quaeque fortia, si liceret, forent ut dura molliunt: ita nos habitum ipsum orationis uirilem et illam uim stricte robusteque dicendi tenera quadam elocutionis cute operimus et, dum leuia sint ac nitida, quantum ualeant nihil interesse arbitramur.

⁹⁵ Messala’s final rejoinder, 42.1, might here be noted.

19 sed mihi naturam intuenti nemo non uir spadone formosior erit...libidinem iuuet ipsum effeminati sexus mendacium, numquam tamen hoc continget malis moribus regnum, ut si qua pretiosa fecit, fecerit et bona.

20 quapropter eloquentiam, licet hanc (ut sentio enim dicam) libidinosam resupina uoluptate auditoria probent, nullam esse existimabo quae ne minimum quidem in se indicium masculi et incorrupti, ne dicam grauis et sancti, uiri ostentet.

21 (statuae et tabulae pictae)

22–3 igitur et ille quem instituimus adulescens quam maxime potest componat se ad imitationem ueritatis, initurusque frequenter forensium certaminum pugnam iam in schola uictoriam spectet, et ferire uitalia ac tueri sciat, et praeceptor id maxime exigat, inuentum praecipue probet.

... 23 nunc illud mali est quod necessaria plerumque silentio transeunt, nec in dicendo uidetur inter bona utilitas.

sed haec et IN ALIO nobis tractata sunt OPERE et in hoc saepe repetenda.

nunc ad ordinem inceptum.

(4) *I.O.* 8.3.56–8 cacozelon, <id> est mala affectatio, per omne dicendi genus peccat; nam et tumida et pusilla et praedulcia et abundantia et arcessita et exultantia sub idem nomen cadunt. denique cacozelon uocatur quidquid est ultra uirtutem, quotiens ingenium iudicio caret et specie boni fallitur, omnium in eloquentia uitiorum pessimum; nam cetera parum uitantur, hoc petitur. 57 est autem totum in elocutione. nam rerum uitia sunt stultum commune contrarium superuacuum: corrupta oratio in uerbis maxime impropriis, redundantibus, compressione obscura, compositione fracta, uocum similium aut ambiguarum puerili captatione consistit. 58 est autem omne cacozelon utique falsum, etiamsi non omne falsum cacozelon; e<s>t <enim quod> dicitur aliter quam se natura habet et quam oportet et quam sat est. totidem autem generibus corrumpitur oratio quot ornatur. sed de hac parte et IN ALIO nobis OPERE plenius dictum est et in hoc saepe tractatum (*Winterbottom*: tractatur *codd.*) et adhuc spargetur omnibus locis. loquentes enim de ornatu subinde quae sint uitanda similia uirtutibus uitia dicemus.

(5) *I.O.* 8.6.67–76 hyperbolen audacioris ornatus summo loco posui. est haec decens ueri (*Spalding*: decensuris *G*) superiectio; uirtus eius ex diuerso par, augendi atque minuendi. 68 fit pluribus modis... (68–72). 73 nec pauciora sunt minuendi... sed huius quoque rei seruatur mensura quaedam. quamuis enim est omnis hyperbole ultra fidem, non tamen esse debet ultra modum, nec alia uia magis in cacozelian itur. 74 piget referre plurima hinc orta uitia, cum praesertim minime sint ignota et obscura. monere satis est mentiri hyperbolen, nec ita ut mendacio fallere uelit. quo magis intuentum est quo usque deceat extollere quod nobis non creditur... (74–5) 76 tum est hyperbole uirtus cum res ipsa de qua loquendum est naturalem modum excessit; conceditur enim amplius dicere, quia dici quantum est non potest, meliusque ultra quam citra stat oratio. sed de hoc satis, quia eundem locum plenius IN EO LIBRO QUO CAUSAS CORRUPTAE ELOQUENTIAE REDDEBAMUS tractauimus.⁹⁶

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Demetrius of Phalerum and fictitious themes (cf. n. 21)

Quintilian is concerned to link the fictitious themes, forensic or deliberative, of modern declamation with Demetrius of Phalerum. He does not however represent

⁹⁶ The writer gratefully acknowledges some acute and helpful comments by Dr M. Winterbottom on an earlier draft of this paper.

him as 'inventor' of the genre; indeed he reaffirms the message of *De causis* (*alio ... libro*) which denied that sufficient information on an 'inventor' existed. As for Demetrius, the contention has sometimes been rejected outright, thus by Martini, *RE* 4, 2830; F. Wehrli, in *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (Demetrios, fr. 182) makes no attempt to evaluate the evidence. If appropriate allowance is made for the context of *I.O.* 2 ch. 4, Quintilian's information on Demetrius, although isolated, is not inherently unlikely.

The information does not, however, extend to the name by which Demetrius called these putative exercises on *factae materiae*; they may be 'speeches' or 'theses'. *θέσεις* is well represented in the lists of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' writings, but does not occur in Demetrius' list, which, however, notes his speeches. *Thesis* in the Peripatetic school, in which Demetrius had been trained, is instructively discussed by H. Thom, *Die Thesis* etc. (Paderborn, 1932), 171ff., al., D. Matthes, 'Hermagoras von Temnos', *Lustrum* (1958), vol. 3 (Göttingen, 1959), and K. Barwick, 'Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros', *Abhand. d. Sächs. Ak.* 54.3 (1963), 16–17, who notes Diog. L. 5.3 (Aristotle) *πρὸς θέσιν συνεγύμναζε τοὺς μαθητάς, ἅμα καὶ ῥητορικῶς ἐπασκῶν* – a matter more extensively explained by Cic. *Or.* 45–6 (with W. Kroll's note).

A further complication arises because the most influential figure in Hellenistic rhetorical theory, Hermagoras of Temnus, c. 150 B.C., adapted some of these procedures to his own purposes, but introduced a distinction between *ζητήματα ἀόριστα* (*quaestiones infinitae* in Roman rhetoric), for general topics, and *ζητήματα ὀρισμένα* (*quaestiones finitae*) for all the rest; cf. especially H. von Arnim's introduction to *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (1898), 92ff. (which first raised the problem here discussed), Thom, op. cit., Matthes op. cit. 1958, 124ff. This distinction became conventional in Roman rhetorical teaching. Hermagoras restricted the old term *θέσις* to general topics, using *ὑπόθεσις* for ζ. ὀρισμένα. Quintilian's fictitious themes *ad imitationem fori consiliorumque* (*De causis* Extract 2) presupposes this conventional distinction, and would refer to a shift from *θέσις* to *ὑπόθεσις*. For Cicero's own terminology, see e.g. *De or.* 1.138 and the commentary by Leeman–Pinkster (1981) ad loc. with bibliography.

Appendix 2. 'De causis' on provenance of declamation (cf. p. 476)

Thus at p. 91 in M. Winterbottom's important article of 1964 'Quintilian and the *Vir Bonus*' (above n. 16), 90–7. As for the *De causis*, Winterbottom based his conclusion on two contexts of the *Institutio*, in which Demetrius of Phalerum is mentioned: the present passage and 10.1 (33 and 80). Yet it needs to be noted that the former only – our present passage – contains a reference to the *De causis*, namely *alio libro*; the latter does not. Now it strikes me as not at all unreasonable to guess, as Winterbottom implied he was doing, that Quintilian's Ciceronian view of Demetrius in Book 10 (based there especially on Cic. *Br.* 37–8, *Or.* 92) – his pleasing and academic qualities as a speaker initiate a decline in Greek oratory – may originally have been part of the picture of decline in the *De causis*, which then concerned oratory as a whole, and not only declamation. The guess concerning the hypothetical context fits the certainty of the above passage and is perhaps little more than what Winterbottom calls it: 'not impossible'. But it may be noted that even without the hypothetical context in Book 10 Winterbottom's contention of an historical element in the *De causis* stands because of the actual reference in Extract 2. Winterbottom's further guess that the decline of Greek oratory associated with Demetrius' name may have been paralleled in the *De causis* by the name of Cassius Severus for Latin oratory (contrast Quintilian's view of Cassius at 10.1.116 with Tac. *Dial.* 26.4) has been

queried by K. Heldmann 1982 (above n. 48), 168ff. This guess is but tangential to my present argument and demands a more extended discussion than would be appropriate here, or was possible in my review of Heldmann's book, *Gnomon* 57 (1985), 144; cf. above n. 50.

Appendix 3. *Cacozelia* (cf. n. 32)

The few pages from Wilamowitz's paper 'Asianismus und Attizismus' 1900 (now *Kl. Schr.* 249–51 with n. 6) remain basic to any further investigation. There are acute philological observations in G. M. A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style*, *Phoenix* Supp. 4 (1961), 141, who, however, would have profited from Wilamowitz's contribution, and in particular fails to notice the width of the Hellenistic and later term in comparison with Quintilian's restrictively stylistic view of *cacozelia*. Useful comments on individual passages are found in the notes on Hermogenes, Book 4 by the Renaissance editor J. Sturm, ... *de ratione inveniendi orat. libri IV* (Argent. 1570) (cit. Norden); the articles on *κακόζηλον* in Ernesti's *Lexicon technol. Graec. rhet.* (1795), and on *Affectatio* in its Latin companion volume; Norden, *Ant. Kunstprosa* i.70 n.; W. Rhys Roberts, *Demetrius On Style*, Glossary s.v. *κακοζηλία*, *ξηροκακοζηλία*; Id., Longinus, *On the sublime*, Append. p. 201; D. A. Russell, 'Longinus' 3.4 n.; some passages are listed in LSJ s.v. *κακόζηλος*, -ον, -ία, but the material is still incomplete.

Thus it is not clearly said anywhere that the early evidence for these terms is dubious and obscure. Neanthes of Cyzicus and Demetrius of Magnesia used to be considered the earliest users. But the former will probably have to be eliminated as a source altogether (Jacoby, *FGrHist* 84 T1), and the mention of the term is best explained as an interpolation from the *Suda* s.v. *καλλίνικος* (despite Jacoby's misgivings). The latter, ap. Diog. Laert. 1.38, is most likely preceded by Demetr. *De eloc.*, though this depends on the early dating of the work, which is still controversial; cf. however, Grube's strong arguments (op. cit. 22ff., 32ff., 39ff.) in favour of a date c. 270 B.C. On the assumption of an early date – the most probable in my view –, the *De elocutione* becomes the earliest extant source for the notion of *κακόζηλον*. Conversely the contemporary usage to which Demetrius appeals is itself one of the indications that favour a Hellenistic context, though not a precise date; *κοινὸν ὄνομα* (186) and *ὡς νῦν ὀνομάζομεν κακόζηλον* (239) imply that the technical notion arises from general usage as current at the time – which does not fit later dates –, and Demetrius' specific application to would-be elegance (in accordance with his Peripatetic theory) differs from later meanings of *κακόζηλον*, as Grube suggests.

Appendix 4. *Quintilian and Tacitus on Cicero's encyclopaedic approach to oratory* (cf. n. 54)

Cicero's encyclopaedic approach to oratory appears prominently throughout Quintilian's *Institutio*. I restrict myself to three weighty instances. In very general terms he describes this approach at *I.O.* 1.10.1 *orbis ille doctrinae quam Graeci ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν uocant*. Another instance, important because of its emphasis on his personal opinion and his *auctores*, also comes in the educational context of the *Institutio*, 2.21.4 *ego (neque id sine auctoribus) materiam esse rhetorices iudico omnes res quaecumque ei ad dicendum subiectae erunt*. This is followed by references to Plato and to Cicero's change of approach from the restricted view of *Inv.* 1.7 to the wider view of *De or.* 1.21 and 3.54. My third example concerns philosophy in particular. I mean the famous reference to Cic. *Or.* 12 which asserts the philosophical character of his oratory and rhetoric, and is later significantly echoed by Tacitus. It may be noted

that this Ciceronian quotation comes in the last book of the *Institutio* (12.2.23); it does not figure in the two initial books on education. Remarks of principle on the orator's education are not restricted to the initial context.

Likewise Tacitus' Messala in *Dial.* chs. 30–2. Especial emphasis is laid on Cicero's studying *omnem omnium artium uarietatem* (30.3) and the same passage of the Ciceronian *Orator* just noted in Quintilian is cited at 32.5.

In both sources, moreover, we note an unmistakable desire not to display simply 'width of interest' or 'universality' but to specify the numerous parts of the rhetorical syllabus. Thus Quint. *I.O.* 1 ch. 9 instructs the *grammaticus* to give early attention to *ratio loquendi* and *enarratio auctorum* – a feature of the syllabus well explained by Barwick (1929) (below n. 49), 81–5; R. Pfeiffer, *Hist. of Class. Schol.* i (1968), *passim*, especially 268–9. Then, at ch. 10, there follow other parts of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία: music, logic, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy; later, e.g. at 12.2, he discusses the 'parts' of philosophy, and at 12 ch. 3 history, as a source of *exempla*, and finally law. Thus again Messala, at *Dial.* 30.1–4, inculcates the need for *auctores cognoscendi*, history, law, and philosophy (with its 'parts'), geometry, and music.

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